



T.C.
ONDOKUZ MAYIS UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF GRADUATE STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

**THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM IN
SOMALIA AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE**

Master's Degree Thesis

Mohamed Abukar ISAK

Supervisor

Asst. Prof. Dr. Fatih Çağatay CENGİZ

SAMSUN

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Mohamed Abukar ISAK tarafından, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Fatih Çağatay CENGİZ danışmanlığında hazırlanan “The Failure of Governmental System in Somalia After the Independence” başlıklı bu çalışma, jürimiz tarafından 13.1.2021 tarihinde yapılan sınav sonucunda oy birliği ile başarılı bulunarak Yüksek Lisans Tezi olarak kabul edilmiştir.

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ABSTRACT

THE FAILURE OF GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM IN SOMALIA AFTER THE INDEPENDENCE

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Somalia continues to experience varying degrees of conflict and instability that has created an administrative vacuum of weaker government and governance institutions. This has led to political chaos, famine and created the birth of warlords and terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, and Al Qaeda, which has later spread across to different parts of the country.

Moreover, the colonization of Somalia by a mixture of European countries such as Italy, France, and Britain greatly caused the underdevelopment of a pre- and post-independent functional Somali state. This thesis will therefore identify the difficulties in state building process and the establishment of the rule of law that continues to affect Somali governments.

The study will also answer the following questions: What are the key factors that drive Somalia to remain a failed state? What roles have interest groups had in the failure of the Somalia's governance system? How have clan and religious institutions served as a governance model in the absence of the functioning state of Somalia? What are the appropriate solutions to state building, peace building, and revival of the Somali identity?

On the other hand, the study will also investigate how the northern regions of Somaliland colonized by the British was able to build governmental institutions while also maintaining their traditional administrative and political structure; and respectively, how the southern regions of Somalia colonized by Italy failed to build modern governmental system. The thesis will consequently provide policy recommendations for state building.

Keywords: Somalia, Colonialism, Politics, Government, Clan

ÖZET

BAĞIMSIZLIK SONRASI SOMALI'DE HÜKÜMET SİSTEMİNİN BAŞARISIZLIĞI

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Somali, hâlen hükümet ve yönetim kurumlarını zayıflatan ve idari bir boşluğa neden olan farklı derecelerdeki çatışma ve istikrarsızlıktan mustarıptır. Bu durum siyasi kaosa, kıtlığa ve savaş ağalarının ortaya çıkmasına ve böylece ülkenin farklı bölgelerine yayılan El Şebab, Deaş, El Kaide gibi terör örgütlerinin peyda olmasına neden olmuştur.

Dahası, Somali'nin İtalya, Fransa ve Britanya gibi ülkelerce sömürgeleştirilmesi büyük ölçüde bağımsızlık öncesi ve sonrası, işleyen bir Somali Devleti'nin geri kalmasına neden olmuştur. Bu tezde, Somali hükümetlerini etkilemeye devam eden, devlet kurma ve hukukun üstünlüğünün tesis etme sürecinde yaşanan zorluklar saptanmaya çalışılacaktır.

Çalışmada ayrıca şu sorular da yanıtlanacaktır: Somali'yi başarısız bir devlet olarak kalmaya iten temel faktörler nelerdir? Somali'nin yönetim sisteminin başarısızlığında çıkar gruplarının rolleri nelerdir? İşleyen Somali devletinin yokluğunda klan ve dini kurumlar nasıl bir yönetim modeline hizmet etmiştir? Devlet inşası, barış inşası ve Somali kimliğinin canlandırılması için uygun çözümler nelerdir?

Öte yandan, bu çalışmada ayrıca İngilizlerce sömürülen Somaliland'in kuzey bölgelerinin bir yandan geleneksel ve siyasi yapılarını muhafaza ederken bir yandan yeni yönetim kurumları kurmayı nasıl başardıkları, İtalyanlarca sömürülen Somali'nin güney bölgelerinin modern yönetim sistemi kurmada nasıl başarısız olduğu incelenecektir. Tezin sonunda devletin inşası için politika önerileri verilecektir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Somali, Sömürgecilik, Siyaset, Hükümet, Kabile

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ABBREVIATIONS

AMISON:	African Union Mission to Somalia
ARS:	Alliance of Re-Liberation of Somalia
EUTM:	European Union Training Mission
FGS:	Federal Government of Somalia
FMS:	Federal Member States
GSL:	Great Somali League
HDMS:	Hizbiya Digil and Mirifle Somali
SCIC:	Supreme Council of Islamic Courts
SDM:	Somali Democratic Movement
SNAF:	Somali National Alliance Force
SNC:	Somali National Congress
SNL:	Somali Youth League
SNM:	Somali National Movement
SPF:	Somali Police Force
SRC:	Supreme Revolutionary Council
SSH	Sub-Saharan Africa
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
TNG:	Transitional National Government
UIC:	United Islamic Courts
UNSC:	United Nations Security Council

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1. INTRODUCTION

Somali is found at the Horn of Africa, South of the Equator, northward to the Gulf of Aden and geopolitically located between Sub-Saharan Africa and Arab and Asia states south of the Asian continent. The capital city is Mogadishu. Its neighboring countries are Ethiopia on the west, Kenya on the south-west, the Red Sea at its north, and finally the Indian Ocean at its Easts (Lewis & Janzen, 2012).



Figure 1.1. The Map of Somalia Country (Lewis & Janzen, 2012).

Somalis have a homogeneous culture; they share a lot of cultural aspects due to the clan lineage of the people of Somalia, hence they live in harmony. Then came the colonialists who disrupted this harmony through the establishment of a colonial government. In the African context, colonization influenced the type of governments; the colonized countries were left with destroyed tradition and lack of administration. Between the 1870s and 1900, the African continent suffered European imperialist

aggression, diplomatic pressures, military invasions, partitioning, and eventual conquest and colonization. In the Somali context, three European countries namely British, France, and Italy are traced as the influencers of government systems being used by the independent Somali Republic since 1960 (Toby, 2009).

So, in order to understand the complicated past of the Greater Republic of Somalia it is necessary to revisit the colonial past of the region. The Somali colonies were divided into five regions. On 1 July 1960, two states, namely Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, gained independence and joined together to create the Democratic Republic of Somalia. "The other Somalis living outside the Republic were very similar to the other Somalis living inside the Republic, since they were all Somalis linked to race, culture, religion, and speak the same language and pursue the same occupation" (Abshir, 2016, p. 3). It shows that British colonial occupiers contributed key components to Somali society that allowed the people of northern Somaliland to stand apart from the rest of the state. Somaliland still faces trials and tribulations to achieve its security and economic goals; yet there are unique elements of the British legacy that have allowed stability, protected Somaliland from a debilitating long-term civil war, and inoculated it from Islamist terrorist groups such as Al Shabaab (Simmons, 2014: 1).

Like many African countries, the Somali nation is a victim of mismanagement by colonial rule, and after independence, it became a victim of dictatorial administration and later under authoritarian leaders. These three governmental regimes in colonial and post-colonial Somalia marshaled and channeled state operations and power, for their own interests, at the expense of the Somali citizen. Somalia's history has for many years been dominated by poor political leadership and inaccurate decision-making thereby making it a nation dominated by leadership failure. It is widely evident that everywhere across the African continent, the postcolonial Africa is filled with a history of non-democratic culture and governance (Samatar, 2016: 1).

Establishing a nation-state out of a demography constituting of many ethnics and homogeneous population is a big challenge, more so, with the low amount of resource that Somalia inherited from its colonial masters. The present-day government is facing hardship caused by the different legal, language, and practices of both communities and

past colonial administrations. The British and Italian systems of governance were the cause of genealogical division of the country's population, which they aimed at organizing public structure and communal relations, and the result was segregation of the population into political and cultural camps that I will analyze in the coming chapters.

The post-independence administration that followed was largely faced by the ambitious tasks of undoing the negativity left by the colonial legacy, including creating common citizenship, public service, increasing administrative capacity to manage the country and developing a political order of accountability. For Somalia to be a functioning state, it requires democratic commitment and audacity within the political leaders (Samatar, 2016: 9).

Another factor for the cause of being a failed state in the history of Somalia was the existence of clans fighting for power and governance. When the Issaq clan took second-class citizens in their territory, resentment occurred. The civil wars and the Somaliland Liberation war that lasted between 1987 and 1991 ended the dictatorial control of Said Barre. The conflict resulted in the collapse of government and displacement of Somali citizens. There have been many instances where rejections were made and rebellion witnessed inside the Somali territory, with government policy and ideology being reviewed as either unfair or unreasonable, with a good example of what the citizens of Somalia found inappropriate to recruiting refugees into the army, with the previous defeats during the wars between Ethiopia and Somali putting doubt on the credibility of army and police (Ahmed & Reginald, 1999: 113).

In addition, economic mismanagement and financial misappropriation also stands out to be among the other key reasons contributing to Somalia's conversion into a failed state. The government deserted socialism in 1980 without displaying any coherent development strategy. The macroeconomic policy of Somalia has been erratic, inconsistent, and ever changing in terms of objectives that confuse domestic and international investment and priorities. Somalia's foreign debt in 1990 was \$1.91 billion (360% of gross domestic product), with an exclusion of the Eastern European 'frozen debt' (Derow, 2018: 3). Poor economic policies have increased economic discrepancies

between Somalia and other countries, reduced Somalia's competitiveness in the world and regional economy, and lowered investment and import-export adjustments. The port of Kismayo, for example, performed lower than expected for many years, especially at the start of 1991. And warlords continued fighting over the control of the ports of Mogadishu, and, Kismayo (Mbugua, 2013: 21).

Multinational organizations have also taken part in fueling conflicts in the country. External investors and countries are present in Somalia in search of raw materials and the exploitation of natural resources. Conflicts over natural resources are witnessed between Hawiye and Darood with their conflict over the control of Juba and Shebelle river valleys growing increasingly. This also contributed to Somalia's poor economic performance, with their clan-based conflict over raw materials occurring at strategic positioning on economic hotspot areas. For over two decades, the Somali government has been a subject of unending civil war, and consequently leading to failure in governance. The government has limited suppression of violence among clans. The constant fighting leads to the collapse of an already less peaceful state, and caused the increase in the number of refugees and IDPs (Mbugua, 2013: 21).

In summary, the persistent political chaos in Somalia has troubled its efforts in the restoration of a functional state. This has now placed the country at impossible dimensions of division and dissent among tribes spread across the whole country, conflicts between the Hawiye clans in the capital Mogadishu; rising armament of tribes; duplication of power of the central authority and the legal system, and inescapable incidents of death, extortion, and banditry. Upon reaching these dimensions, in December 1991, the then UN Secretary-General Javier Perez DE Cuellar, contacted the Arab League, African Union, Organization of Islamic Cooperation. After evaluating the situation, he eventually reported to the UN Security Council on the urgent need for intervention in Somalia. The UN then sent an emissary of representatives drawn from these countries to Somalia to hold talks with the conflicting parties. Because of the talks, all the leaders of the faction outside General *Hussein Farrah Aidid* expressed their support for the ceasefire and stated that they would support the UN initiatives for peace settlement in Somalia (Bir, 1999: 9).

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY

2.1. The Concept of “Failed State”

There is increasing awareness of the danger to international security posed by collapsed and unstable states, frequently marred by serious internal conflict, which also has the potential to destabilize neighboring states and provide ungoverned territories that can provide a safe haven for terrorists. The failure of their governments to provide basic services is perceived to be a major contributory factor. Poorly performing developed countries are related to humanitarian disasters; mass migration; environmental degradation; regional instability; energy insecurity; global pandemics; international crime; the spread of weapons of mass destruction and, of course, transnational terrorism (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007: 3).

Other key conceptual studies on state failure include Helman and Ratner's "Saving Failed States," written in 1993 in *Foreign Policy* (Helman & Ratner, 1993: 89), and Kaplan's influential 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* post, "The Coming Anarchy," which identified state failure in West Africa and darkly predicted that it would spread throughout the West (Kaplan, 1994: 44-65).

More recently, Cojanu & Popescu (2007: 2) analyzed that "conceptions of state fragility, weakness and failure converge on two ideas". First, fragility refers to the inability and/or reluctance of such states to provide fundamental public goods, such as protection from external attacks, the rule of law, and basic social services to most of their people. Second, fragility is a matter of degree from states that have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot offer security or healthcare to anybody, to some states that can provide most of the public goods to most of their people. Despite the large body of scholarly writings on the subject, there is no agreement on the definition of state failure (Cojanu & Popescu, 2007: 3). The most widely accepted definition is offered by Zartman (1995: 5) who defines failure as occurring when “the basic functions of the state are no longer performed”.

Patrick (2006: 27) considers that "state strength is a relative concept and can be measured by the state's ability and willingness to deliver key political goods linked to statehood: physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic governance, and

social welfare." Many countries have crucial gaps in one or more of these four governance fields. In essence, they have legal, but not true sovereignty. In the security sector, they are struggling to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, monitor borders and territories, ensure public order, and provide security from crime. In the economic arena, efforts are being made to follow basic macroeconomic and fiscal policies or to create a legal and regulatory environment conducive to entrepreneurship, private enterprise, free trade, natural resource management, foreign investment, and economic development. In the political domain, there is a lack of legitimate governing structures that provide effective administration, ensure power controls, protect fundamental rights and freedoms, keep representatives accountable, provide impartial justice and enable broad citizen participation. Finally, in the social domain, they struggle to meet the basic needs of their populations by failing to make even modest investments in health, education, and other social services (Patrick, 2006: 27-30).

Below, Table 1 shows the characteristics of strong and weak/failed states.

Table 1.1.Characteristics of strong and weak or failed states

Characteristics	Strong State	Weak State/Failed State
The state monopoly on the use of force	Exists	More or less absent
The state sovereignty	High	Low
Quality of democracy	High	Low
Security	High	Low
State control over the territory	Exists	More or less absent
State control over borders	Exists	More or less absent
Effectiveness of institutions, infrastructure and bureaucracy	High	Low

Get rid of physical violence	concentrated in the hand of the state and of persons authorized by it	Illegally also in the hands of non-state players
Crime and corruption	Low	More or or out of control
The legal system	Reliable	Unreliable or ineffective
Economy	Funtioning	in more or less deep crisis
Demographic changes	slight and under control	considerable and out of control, enormous streams of refugees, mass emigration

(Cojanu & Popescu, 2007: 3).

2.2. Colonialism In Question

As the thesis will focus on the effect of colonialism on Somalia's governance, the study will explain what colonialism refers to although the issue shall be specifically discussed in the second chapter. The term is defined as a phenomenon that a strong state seeks to control over a weak one, extends its influence over it, and exploits its economic, natural, social and cultural resources (Horvath, 1972: 45-47). Therefore, the discussion will be: How does colonialism make sense of plundering and stealing most of the wealth of the colonial countries, destroying the dignity of the peoples of colonial countries, destroying their civilizational and cultural heritage?

On the other hand, colonialism means that the only civilized culture is capable of moving the country from a state of backwardness and ignorance to a stage of civilization. Therefore, it is also possible to answer the question: How does colonialism make sense of subjugating a group of people in a state or a group of internationalists for foreign rule from another country while the inhabitants of the country are called colonialists. Historically, it has been observed that most colonies separate them from the colonial state by seas, oceans and ethnic characteristics different from the colonialists,

and are ruled by a population sent by the colonial state to live in and rule and exploit its natural resources (Horvath, 1972: 45-47).

From this understanding of colonialism, it is important to explain how colonialism impoverished the Black Continent. Before Europeans came to Africa, the Rulers in Songhai and Mali had had thousands of slaves. Cities were already raided one another to take captives and to sell them like a good. Slaves had already worked a lot of time to earn his or her freedom. However, a form of slavery that destroyed African life and culture was introduced by Europeans in the 1400s. African cities were raided by European traders and people were kidnapped. Some Africans were captured in the war and sold by other Africans to European traders. Around 10 to 12 million Africans were forced into slavery from 1520 to 1860. In North and South America, they were sent to faraway European colonies. Many more individuals were rescued, but before arriving to the workplace in Europe. They died of illness or starvation. Many were killed in raids and the Africans were captured and sold. Two thirds of men between the ages of 18 and 30 were taken. This left fewer individuals to lead villages and families. There were not enough jobs in African towns and cities. The family buildings were demolished (Khan, 2016).

In 1869, Egypt and France opened the Suez Canal as an important new sea route connecting Europe with Asia in a shorter and faster way, and at this time most of the European continent was unknown to the Europeans so that they controlled the coasts. The European powers became interested in exploring and colonizing Africa for various reasons. The first reason was economic because the industrial revolution at this time made European countries in a race to control African raw materials such as palm oil, cotton, copper and rubber. On the one hand, it was important to control commercial markets and to export European industrial products. In addition to this, European countries were in a state of competition, and the number and size of colonies had been owned by each colonizer because this was considered evidence of its superiority from other countries (Khan, 2016).

Not surprisingly, when the Europeans ended the slave trade, they did not lose their interest in Africa. Africa could supply Europe with raw materials and new markets

for European products. Scientists and researchers were interested in African wildlife and natural resources. European missionaries wanted to convert Africans to Christianity. Many missionaries taught European ways of thinking. These often conflicted with and destroyed African governance traditions. In the nineteenth century, European countries namely Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany began to compete for the control of Africa. To avoid wars over lands, European and American leaders met and discussed how to divide Africa. No Africans were consulted. Over the next twenty years, many countries established colonies in Africa. By 1912, only Ethiopia and Liberia remained independent. Subsequently, colonialism often increased tensions and led to violence between African ethnic groups (Khan, 2016).

Colonialism, in clear words, is the complete control of a foreign people over others, their land and their destiny. This ownership of the people helps the colonizers to decide the future of the people in possession. Colonialism has become a fashion among industrialized nations in the world history to own colonies in a foreign country, thereby regulating and deciding the political, economic, and social lives of those colonized people. This was basically carried out by Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, and Germany. All of them had owned Asian, African, and Latin American colonies (Yakubu, 2014: 479).

Colonization took on distinct dimensions in Africa and a lot of tactics were used to subdue and govern Africans. Power was used to overrule the people and to cooperate with the natives; treaties whose substance was never understood were signed. There were two broad administration trends that were adopted: namely Direct Administration and Indirect Administration. The French colonies conducted a direct assimilation law that forced the colonized French-Africans to drop their African culture most, if not all. The British introduced the Direct Administration and extended these areas to main areas close to coastal towns with a large number of British settlers such as Freetown, Accra, Lagos, etc. These areas had direct administration since the British were actively interested in their administration, and they were also called crown colonies. On the other hand, the Indirect Rule was experienced in areas outside the crown colonies and it was called by protectorate (Yakubu, 2014: 479).

The effect of colonialism took two contradictory dimensions in Africa. Because of colonial rule on the continent, Africa became underdeveloped. As a consequence of the existence of the colonial policy, there was a spate of economic exploitation and social deterioration. Such policies encouraged the economic exploitation of dehumanized Africans, stagnated the economy of Africa, and corrupted it. These policies include (a) the deterioration of the local economy and production. Africans were forced to import goods manufactured by the Europeans, (b) coercion and (c) discrimination. Division of labor between nations as Africans became mere producers (d). Colonizers left Africa without building schools and colleges, or even industries (Yakubu, 2014: 479).

At the start of the 21st century; most African nations had new heads that came to power through coups or civil wars, or both. Cote d'Ivoire, for example, had a military coup in 1999, followed by a civil war (north versus south) that reported a large number of people becoming refugees due to malnutrition. Similarly, where an estimated 5.4 m (IRC, 2008) lives were lost, the Democratic Republic of Congo tasted its own too. Mali is in a similar condition at present. Liberia went through the same struggles. Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Chad, and Sudan saw similar conflicts and dictatorship administrations (Yakubu, 2014: 479).

When such conditions existed, some African leaders seemed to be tyrannical. While democratic mechanisms, such as political parties, electoral processes, etc., have been put in place in almost all African countries, election results are not always recognized as free and fair. As it seems in the literature, colonialism can be considered one of the factors that contributed to the failure of governance in the whole of Africa (Yakubu, 2014: 479).

2.3. Problem Statement

It is ideally assumed and expected that countries upon gaining independence should be progressive, united, democratic, and with fully functional state institutions. On the other part, newly established states seek support from locally and internationally established organizations in order to acquire political, economic and social support towards improving and strengthening their governance. In the case of the Somali state,

there is a rise in the number of non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), interest groups, friendly states, and many other organizations which are supporting the country to implement a functioning governmental system. Examples of these institutions include the African Union mission called AMISOM and some other organizations namely UNSOM, IMF, and WB (AMISOM, 2019).

The Somali Republic gained its independence in July 1960 with Aden Abdulla Osman becoming the nation's first democratically elected president; and at the same time, the country's constitutional referendum allowed the country to set the ground for a democratic republic. Despite the fact that Somalia, just like other African countries, succeeded in obtaining its independence, to date, it is still not fully functional state as it was supposed to be. The earliest hindrances to the country's progression towards complete democracy despite earning its independence, was a military coup led by Siad Bare that occurred in 1969. This caused continuity of non-democratic governance of the country, as people in power and in the ruling clan engaged in abuse of power. This has since the subsequent years bred a culture of clanship and religious-based regimes. The past six decades since Somalia's independence, the Republic has repeatedly possessed the longest history of a failed state characterized as having a weak government and structures.

This study addresses regime related problems, with the inclusion of administrative problems, representational problems, lack of identity, and no functionality of the government. These problems illustrate the division in Somalia with regards to interests, which are the causes of the nonfunctioning Somali nation. Analysis explores the proposition prolonging the crisis within Somalia with examples of diplomatic incompetence, missed opportunities, external interferences divided by political and economic interests.

Many efforts, both at regional and international level have been initiated whereby many important national peace conferences were held to stabilize the republic. United Nations operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), which took place between 1993-1995, was one of the earliest efforts conducted with the agenda of improving state-building process: Unfortunately, none was successful.

The nation regained hope after the Nairobi Peace Accord bore some fruitful results by leading to the implementation of a Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The TFG process that occurred between 2004 and 2006 involved negotiations and considerable external pressure on democratic governance from other states and institutions. Unfortunately, the TFG has taken too long to implement a fully established and operational democratic government, as it suffered serious internal splits fueled by group interests and representations.

2.4. Purpose of this Study

The purpose of this study is to analyze and explain the failure of the governmental systems in post-independence Somalia while examining whether this failure is related to internal or external factors.

It is known that Somali has a history of internal strife and external war, with examples such as the Somali conflict with Ethiopia on the administration of Ogaden region in 1977, the rise of warlords, interest groups, and clannish governance that affected the collapse of Somalia's government. The self-declaration of Somaliland as an independent state was another serious factor that drove the state formation and peace building conferences. In the governance approach, the relationship between these institutions arises from the obligation to fulfill all duties and responsibilities collectively (BBC, 2017). However, the case of Somalia is a serious one as many attempts have failed in the development of strong and reformed institutions and government system.

2.5. Research Methodology

This study will use the qualitative research method. The reason for selecting qualitative approach is to deconstruct and simplify complex societal phenomena through analysis of human experiences involved or linked to such events (Flick, 1998:15). The researcher will use qualitative approach to conduct critical inquiry and capture various aspects and issues involved in the context of the topic of the study, putting the perspective of academic studies, inform qualitative method, acknowledge information and practices of other studies with as local knowledge being sought for as much as possible. The study will explain key drivers of the collapse of Somali State and how to revive the governance system in Somalia. In order to realize the purpose of this research,

the researcher will use secondary and primary data. Primary data will be retrieved from interviews conducted on political elites, such as the director of the presidency in southwestern Somalia. Based on his view, the political context and the bureaucratic administration in Somalia were analyzed. In addition to that, I conducted other interviews with the Somalia military attaches that they analyzed colonial and military dictatorial administration rule and how western and southern forces concerned the Somalia country. Finally, I interviewed with some policy-makers, such as the previous public work minister who deeply explained the political culture of Somalia and the lack of public infrastructures in the country. Moreover, secondary data will be gathered from books, articles, journals, reports, policies, state-building documents, news sources, and other documents relevant to the topic of study. More importantly, the study will use agreements and protocols between the Somali government and other major parties who have been involved in peace building processes and efforts in Somali (Flick, 1998: 15).

The outcome of this research is considered reliable data and results will be of important for any political evaluation on Somalia. The data will also highlight the role and impact of colonialism in the Somalia's political context and the influence of peace building conferences held internally in Somalia or abroad. Finally, this thesis will also track the future of Somalia and possible political scenarios in the country.

2.6. Research Questions

The following will be the research questions of this study:

1. What are the key drivers to the collapse of Somali state?
 - a) Is clannish federalism compatible with Somali's administrative structure?
2. What is the role of interest groups in the failure of the Somali governance system?
3. How have clan and religious institutions been used as a governance model in the absence of the functioning state of Somali?
4. What are the appropriate solutions to state-building, peace building, and reviving of Somali identity?

2.7. Importance of the Study

The study will be of huge importance to the Federal Government of Somalia, stakeholders and partners of Federal Republic of Somalia, other states that are continuously participating in providing support to Somali government, the international organizations, to policy makers, and finally to scholars.

The study will be used to increase the knowledge of how the specifications of the Somali people can be met through a participatory government where the people are involved in decision-making. This study will also highlight the importance of an inclusive government which has in many occasions worked, especially when it comes to the government environment which includes a lot of divided groups, such as clannish federalism, and regional based federal member states with each group possessing a different approach to governance and leadership.

The partners of Somali government will be able to apply information provided herewith to enhance their support. The government effectively functions when it has a vibrant economy and social stability. The private institutions in the country are largely composed of investors and thus, the country requires the investors input to address the low development of the country by increasing investments. The partners will also learn of the measures being placed towards improving security and general economy of the country, thus the information being provided will increase their confidence towards investment into rebuilding the state. Other non-state actors such as NGOs and human rights will be able to facilitate the state in areas where state will find them positively effective. The state in its current limited condition cannot properly gather information on the ground concerning the needs of all citizens, and also, with the many years of war, most NGOs and humanitarian organizations were a response to the citizens after the central government collapsed in 1991. Thus, they will be able to develop reports and make recommendations within which the government can later implement towards improving the quality of life and livelihood of its people and be reflected in governance in general.

This study will be of great help to other states and international organizations providing capacity building support to the Somali government. They will first prioritize

the issue of supporting the Somali government in taking control of the state and improving democracy. Member countries of the African Union have been at the forefront of implementing a stable state in Somalia with the likes of AMISOM being on the frontline towards smoothening transition, law and order in Somalia. While either working in groups and individually, other countries will be expected to receive more knowledge and clear recommendations towards their involvement in Somali's peace and transitional governance.

Policy makers will use the study to improve the quality of laws governing the Somali people. Like other nations that gained their independence, they were also not an exception when it came to conflicts similar to what is currently witnessed in Somalia. But of great interest and worth emulating are countries such as Kenya, which despite experiencing a post-election violence in 2007-2008, saw the promulgation of a new constitution. This sets a good precedence of what policy makers in Somalia can learn and execute to improve governance. The policy makers, having seen the fact that democracy has been threatened for many years, will be able to review how it can best suit Somalia to improve its policies towards a successful government and a prosperous country.

Future scholars will use the resulting information given in the study to increase their understanding of what is happening in the current Somali nation, and therefore the findings of this study will be used to first form the literature of their study, and second, to create a platform for future studies whereby the researchers will fill the gaps left by this study, and conduct recommended areas for further studies.

2.8. Scope of the Study

On content scope, the study will be conducted to investigate the causes of the failures of the governmental systems in Somalia after the independence. The study will also be determined to answer: What are the key drivers leading to the collapse of Somali state? What is the role of interest groups in the struggle of the Somali governance system? How have clanship and religious institutions been applicable as a governance model in the absence of the functioning state of Somali? What are the appropriate solutions to state-building, reconciliation, peacebuilding, and revival of Somali identity?

The thesis is arranged into six chapters: The first chapter is the introductory chapter. The second chapter will discuss the conceptual framework of the study, namely the concepts of failed states and colonialism, while, entailing problem statement, research purpose, research methodology, research questions, importance and scope of the study. The third chapter will discuss Somalia's governance system, assessment of constitution-making, clan-based traditional governance system, Somalia's pre-colonial administrative structures, the existence of traditional and formal governance, colonial legacy, Trusteeship Period of the Somali Governance (1950-1960), the rise of multi-party system in Somali, and general elections in 1959.

Chapter Four focuses on the failure of governmental systems on Somalia after independence, while at the same time highlighting the Siad Barre's dictatorship in Italian postcolonial period, the root causes of governance failure in Somali, the Somali's foreign policy, interest-driven crises, interest in protracted conflict, Islamic actors as the resurgence of religion in Somali politics, and the Al-Shabaab as an organization and a governance movement.


Chapter Five entails the current governance system in Somalia and captures Turkish state-building efforts in Somalia, Somali's conflict resolution using the 4.5 formula. The final chapter will be the conclusion and recommend some policy measures to overcome the failure of governmental system in Somalia.

3. GOVERNANCE SYSTEM SOMALIA

3.1. Clan-Based Social Structure of Somalia

Somalia is dominated by a homogeneous population that constitutes the overwhelming majority of the Somali population. Originally Somali people are divided into clans. These clans are further sub-divided into sub-clans, which forms clan families. The families living in the intra-region of southern Somalia are *Rahanwein* and *Digil* or *Sap*, who are mainly, farmers and agricultural herders. The Sap is a tribe made up of indigenous people and of Somali groups that migrated here. Other tribal families are *Darod* at north-eastern Somalia and *Ogaden* at the border with Kenya. *Hawiya* mainly inhabit the central and southern Shabelle. The *Ishaq* live at the western and central parts of the country. Monasteries exist in northwest and south of Somalia. The Tony is located within coastline lines of Marka, Kismayo, and the Kenyan border coastal strip, with the exception of *Baguinis* who are islanders. *Arabs* form the minority, mainly of Yemenite origin. The Bantu population also forms the minority group and they practice profitable irrigation agriculture, which is practiced around rivers Jubba and Shebelle. Most *Bantus* are descended from slave farmers. Finally, the country has a small Italian population (Lewis & Janzen, 2012).

Ethnic composition (2000)



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Figure 2.1. Somali Ethnic Group Percentage (Lewis & Janzen, 2012).

3.2. Religion in Somalia


The Somali people are among the most religious people in the Islamic world, praying and believing in Monotheism (One God). The doctrine of Islam is a unitary force that links Somalis and supports their brotherhood and cooperation in their interests as if religion is one of the major factors in the Somali existence as a stand-alone unit in East Africa. Somalia is an Islamic state with the *Shafi* sect being dominant and with various groups including Tariqas which entail Qadiriyah, Ahmadiyah, and Salihya. (Nations, 2009).

The Somalis played a fundamental role in the protection and defense of the Islamic religion in East Africa. The Islamic kingdoms in the Horn of Africa led by the Somalis defended the Islamic religion from the Christian Abyssinian Empire, which sought to control the Horn of Africa to spread Christianity. On the contrary, the Somalis were able to spread the Islamic religion in the Horn of Africa and throughout the African continent. The Somali diaspora continues its religious role by spreading the Islamic religion after the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. After the admission of

hundreds of thousands of Somalis abroad as asylum seekers in Europe, America, Australia and Africa, the Somalis clung to their ancient religion. The Somalis built mosques and Islamic centers in these countries, thus contributing to the strengthening of the bonds of brotherhood between the Somali community and other Muslim communities. The hosts welcomed the Somali efforts to adhere to the religion and Islamic values to spread the Islamic religion. The Somali communities in the diaspora grew to be the leaders of the Muslim communities in the diaspora by strictly adhering to customs and Islamic traditions, appearances, and morals. To date, majority of the Somali women in the diaspora continue to uphold their modest dressing (Adem, 2018).

The Sudanese thinker Sheikh Hassan Abdullah al-Turabi says that “Islam in the Horn of Africa has two men, a man in Somalia and the other in Sudan,” a phrase that indicates the extent to which Islam is empowered in these countries and their ramifications of Islamic values and the spread of what is known as political Islam and jihadist Islam in addition, both countries are members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the largest Islamic grouping in our contemporary world (Adem, 2018).

Religious affiliation (2005)



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Figure 2.2. Religious affiliation in Somalia (Britanica, 2000).

3.3. Pre-colonial Administrative Structure of Somalia

Clannish administrative systems in Somalia are an old recurrence in its history. Contrary to Western nations, pre-colonial Somalis are wrongly assumed a "stateless society," "with rules and lack of rulers". These debates lack recognition of administrative authority, judicial system, banking and insurance practices, security and others. The Somalis thrived on social and political state structures way before colonialism (Ingiriis, 2018: 63). The Somali state was divided into clan regions that existed in traditionally acceptable ways, with each clan recognizing their neighboring clans; and this knowledge was not limited to competition for water, land, pastures, camels, and other resources. Mogadishu is documented to have had two sultans, the *Hamarweyn* and *Shanqani* (Alpers, 1983: 441-459).

French explorers collected data in the 1880s that showed how Somalia was divided by the colonialists including the British (Northern Somalia), Italian (Southern Somalia), and the province of northeastern Kenya. After two regions, namely, UN trustee territory and the British, possessed Northern Somalia (under Italy), were lowly expected to form a government at that time, but a new republic was formed through a merger that ended post-colonial era. Somalia is now divided into states namely Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubaland, Puntland, and Southwestern states (Ingiriis, 2018: 62).

Despite being subject to political repression, traditional clans in Somalia represent important factors in government and governance. Since the civil war in 1990, many clans secured fragile region, and restored law and order. Their roles are to regulate common resources utilization i.e., sharing land for grazing and water sources. The *xeer* clan elders are important as they are depended upon in legislating, enforcing, and judging society. Decision are made and overseen by male sheikhs in clans using consensus that subordinates individual's interest for the sake of the clans and marginalized groups. The political structure in traditional authorities mostly depends on the pastoral community. On the other hand, traditions are divided into two categories, namely devotes to religion (*wadaad*) and keepers of worldly affairs and (*waranleh*).

Whoever practices religion is *Wadaad*. All others are (*Waranle*). *Wadaads* do not participate in fighting and clan politics. They reconcile rivalries, mediate between parties i.e. among the *Waranle*. They sanction the decisions that the elders of the *waranle* make spiritually. However, the sheikhs of the *Waranle* can improve respect and prestige through demonstration of religious knowledge and affairs. The absence of hierarchy in political units is evidence in Somalia (Gundel & Omar, 2006: 14).

Traditional forms of governance are very common in Somalia, although there are little variations between regions. The above general description for conventional structures is valid. The differences in responsibilities, legitimacy and roles of traditional administration were visible before and after collapse of government. Differences in traditional (*xeer*), conventional and Sharia laws are under investigation (Gundel & Omar, 2006: 4).

Outside direct control of government, (*xeer*) is the predominant justice. In Puntland and southwestern states, revival of traditional laws after collapse of state is evident. Traditional leaders form the foundation of Puntland (1998) and Somaliland (1991). In south and central Somalia, local leadership have maintained peace using traditional administrative structures, which have failed in the unifying of hybrid regions because of increased activities by warlord, banditry, and differences in cultural practices and ethnic groups. On the other hand, the impact of the intervention of the United Nations operation in Somalia as well as other external attempts at peace building and restoring peace to the founding of the collapsed state of Somalia (Gundel & Omar, 2006: 4).




Figure 2.3. The Clan Location in Somalia (Bdeco.Tripod, 1991).

The spread of clan states in former Italian colonies was politicized and legalized with division arising from pre-colonial Somali clan nations. Somalia's distribution into clan regions was lethal, with them being used to having a clan based administrations in post-colonial era, after a sudden lack of a central government. Thereafter the British Somaliland came out of the union in 1960 to form the Republic of Somaliland on the interests of the Isaaq clan (Refworld, 2004). In the former Italian Somali colony, *Majeerteeniya* was renamed as Puntland, and made advancement according to the

Mahmud *Saliban / Majerteen* clan, with each clan having its territory (Ingiriis, 2018: 62).

The contemporary clan-states “Somali territories” are stateless; similar to Palestinian territories and thus now claiming autonomy and independence to become clan-states. Most clan-dominated clan-states consider themselves as nations. The name ‘Somalia’ is itself derived from *Samaale* or *Irir Samaale* clan, which consists of the *Hawiye*, *Isaaq*, and *Dir* (except *Daarood*). There also exists *Maay* and *Maxaa Tiri* contrasting languages. Somalis are split by colonial regimes differences including divergent legal structures, inherited grudges, life, and speech (Ingiriis, 2018). This makes it difficult for Somalis to defeat politicized clan and colonial polarization (Ingiriis, 2018: 62).

3.4. Existence of Traditional and Formal Governance in Somalia

After independence in 1960, the Somali central government performed below average. This is to say that it was not able to sustain stability among the citizens within its territory with more militaristic characteristics of the successive regimes until 1991. This caused thirty years of chaos, collapse of public institutions, destruction of economies, and displacement of millions of citizens, and continuous arms struggle. Failed peace negotiations for dialogue, food insecurity, piracy, and radical religious activities grew. Several global efforts and support towards central government law and order suffered setbacks. There have been fifteen negotiations attempts that failed to establish a viable and legitimate government. In Puntland and Somalia, many parties, and entities representing government emerged legitimately. An increase in violence and instability was witnessed in Puntland and Somalia. In rather stable and independent regions, formal administrative structures were replaced with indigenous groups, with likes of Senate (*Guurti*), Peace Seekers (*Nabadoon*), and other local civil society organizations. They set community priorities, maintained peace, and distributed resources. They largely blended the traditional system of governance consisting of agreements (*xeer*) and traditional laws defining responsibilities and rights of families, neighborhoods and clans. Currently, a large percent of tensions has been resolved through councils of elders. However, today's official authorities assert that they cannot

withstand the challenges without the presence of a stable government, thus raising the need for a prominent central government in support of law enforcement (*xeer*) or ratified state law. Hence, the traditional systems of authority are ready to support any government administration in ensuring that the laws are enforced and the peace is upheld. Although there is a gap in national services in construction, education, and health services, these gaps may cause clan elders to find their own needs without the government (Gabho, 2010).

The framework of modern government maintains political, natural and traditional authorities to ensure political stability and accountability of executive government. Traditionally, elderly adults in government tend to undermine the leading authority. However, the complementary ability of traditional authorities to modern formal government is apparent, with 'GUURTI' in Somaliland being backed to resolve political disputes by government, thus preventing escalation of conflicts using traditional conflict resolution mechanism (Gundel & Omar, 2006: 13).

3.5. Contrasting Colonial Systems and Legacy in Somalia

Halfway to the 19th century, major European states i.e. France, Italy, and Britain colonized Africa's Horn where Somalia is located. The British and Italians had a great influence over modern Somalia (Lewis, 2002: 40). Pre-colonial Somalis lived in a stateless society with their norms and rules without any form of external rulers. The British intervention in Somalia was installed with the aim of protecting meat supplies for its garrison in "Gulf of Aden". Aden is situated at the junction between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and can be found on the Arab Peninsula's southwest corner (Lewis, 2002: 40).

Aden possesses a deep natural port and protected inlets that positions it as an ideal place for sea route and entrepreneurship especially managing major shipping passages. Realizing the strategic importance of Aden, the British took control of the battles and sea port in Aden in a swift and decisive engagement that occurred on 19 January 1839, thus providing the British East India Company with a significant presence in the Middle East and effectively imposed British control over Aden for decades to come. The long-standing rivalries with the French and Russian empires increased due to

the extensive invasions of these empires in North Africa and the Middle East later in the nineteenth century, making Aden a strategic location for the British Empire. The discovery of oil in the Middle East, coupled with the Royal Navy's decision to switch from coal to oil, made the preservation of Aden a colonial site and hub for the British Empire even more important, to include the trial of Allied war efforts during World War II (Smitson, 2010: 2).



Figure 2.4. Map of Gulf of Aden (France 24, 2008).

Britain intentionally extended its permanent occupation in Somalia, which started after the elimination of Egyptian forces in 1884, and driven by the threat of the French in its territorial expansion. Thus, it colonized Somalia to maintain its protection of the trade routes. The Somali clans agreed the protection of British forces against the Egyptian forces. In 1886, clan elders signed a treaty with Britain allowing deployment of

British forces for peace, with three Deputy British Consuls establishing British garrison at Aden (Simmons, 2014: 61).

In 1888, British and French signed treaties recognizing Djibouti as a French colony to solidify boundaries between them. Italy in the south established a strong state power, and claimed east of British protectorate while also continuing negotiating with local clans to make coast of Somalia an Italian protectorate. As outlined, the division of Somalia by colonial powers marked the beginning of changes in social structure of traditional tribal rules and behavior, shifting from strong viable survival practices to weak and modernization strategies (Migdal, 1988: 55).

Initially, clans took the advantage of ensuing competition for social control by Europeans rivals in neighboring states such as Kenya and the Ethiopian empire to avoid complete subjugation to colonialists. Result of their actions only allowed invading powers to entrench clan territory reducing the clans' ability to govern them. Britain's negotiating treaty of 1897 with King Menelik of Ethiopia strengthened the reservation's southern border. This particular treaty was proven to be a point of contention between Somalia and Ethiopia since its inception due to Britain's failure to consult with the local Somali population during the border demarcation. This is one of the most fatal mistakes Britain made in long-term Somali relations, but it disrupted the old survival strategy of pastoralist clan's property rights. This turmoil in the clan's grip on social governance on a path of disintegration as proof is revealed in case studies presenting Migdal's ability of state formation. The country's colonizers agreed with Ethiopia regarding their respective territorial boundaries. This prevented unwelcomed conflict for the Ethiopians, but disturbed clans' peace and increased conflicts (Simmons, 2014: 8).

The Italian colony's approach to Somalia was to establish a permanent colony, which would be completely subjugated to the rule of the Italian government. The Italian's goal was not to instill a quick colonial regime, a powerful country, and witnessing the clan structures. By 1920, Italy took Somali's coast through treaties, exorbitant incentives, and the use of military might towards creating an economically profitable venture. This would allow agricultural potential to attract Italian settlers. Italians colonized Somalia, which was filled with government offers, supplying food,

and expanding Italy's population. The Italian approach formed a strong Somali state that fostered a weaker society and minimized the clannish style of governance (Simmons, 2014: 8).

In 1899, "*Mad Mullah*" a Somali religious colonial rebel, initiated an uprising against British protectorate for twenty years, attempting to reverse Western turmoil in Somalia. Sheikh Sayyed Muhammad Abdullah Hassan saw the British and Ethiopian as "colonialists" destroying the Muslim faith and he officially declared holy war against them. His movement stemmed from Sayyed's lamented Ethiopian incursion into Somali pastoral lands like the British, and in the 20-year war against British colonial forces has been the most important one in history. Initially, Sayyed's long relationship with British was anchored upon sermons taking place in the interiors and coastal cities and it never sounded problematic up to that point. Indeed, the British welcomed his authority and aligned with their indirect rule that empowered clan leaders. The Sayyed's ability to infiltrate the local clans in a manner inconsistent with the meager British Somali agenda was not initially considered a problem by the British. The relationship soured when Sayyed was provoked by British authorities' refuse to expel the Catholic's Barbera homeless children's mission. His followers were termed dervishes (Simmons, 2014: 10).

Sayyed was recruited from Ogaden clan from the Somali descent tribe. His ability to influence and mobilize his local clan's population soon disrupted British relations with clan leaders, especially the northern clans. Sayyed raided neighboring *Isaaq* clans due to a dispute over grazing rights, much to the distraught of the British. This showed Somalis the possibility of preserving regional peace. The state and colonial legitimacy depended on economy's stability and security. Organizations devised strategies to enhance strong state to come at greater increase in capabilities (Migdal, 1988: 105). However, this conflict would escalate and amplify over the next 20 years of British's incomplete defeat of Sayyed. In 1905, a respite lasted four years, and Sayyed was granted authority by colonizers, which entailed grazing land in government reserve (Tuval, 1963: 61). Sayyed continued his harassment of tribes in the protectorate and the British took action. British achieved victory against the Dervishes of Ogaden region in 1920. Sayyed escaped despite being defeated and died at the end of 1920 (Simmons, 2014: 54).

The Sayyed “Mad Mullah” continued his battle against British colony. Later on, the Sayyed failed to achieve an Islamic state of Somalia by following in the same legacy as a pioneer of Somali nationalism. Despite his long onslaught against the British authorities, the Sayyed opposed the ancient traditions of his people that no clan should control another. In addition, power should not be conferred on one man (Drysdale, 2000: 5). The unexpected outcome of the battle, however was to consolidate the territorial division between the Northern Protectorate of Great Britain and Italian Somalia. This relationship between Somalia and the British after independence remained an argument between Somalia and Ethiopia, but it helped establish the East end of Somaliland. A border later recognized by Somaliland's self-declared independent state in 1991 (Simons, 1995: 35-36).

The Dervish uprising and a two-decade war frustrated their indirect rule and worried their investment on administrative and infrastructural projects within the reserves. The war came to a conclusion but it left high degrees of hostility and distrust between clans and their colonizers. British's re-establishment of social control was designed using local survival strategies. A number of programs such as educational system led to the encroachment of Western education and influenced traditional Islamic education conducted by sheikhs. When World War II began in Africa, attempts to improve education were halted until the Italians defeat in 1941. Revenues for programs came from import, export and license fees. Main exports included hides, skins and cattle from British colonial reserves (Louis, 1955). The British created urban bureaucrats' classes of civil personnel and traders, thereby forming a small segment of elites.

Colonialism involved small formal decision-making groups in society. The group was characterized with properly educated elites who implemented indirect rule and clan leadership being characterized by slightly knowledgeable and entrusted local leaders to support in decision making (Migdal, 1988: 102).

The overriding concern by British administrators was to continue maintaining peace with minimal interference. They enacted indirect rule using smaller units of expatriate with support from Indians and Arabs scribes. Before the end of World War II, this method was facilitated by the homogeneity and relative amalgamation of the

three major clans in the north (i.e. the Deir, Issac and Darrod clans) and more ambitious attracted additional intervention by British colonizers (Migdal, 1988: 102).

Tribal leaders, or sheikhs, played a pivotal role in local administration. There were links between district commissioners and the population. Simmons (2014) expounds indirect rule as the source of a variety of situations in order to pacify traditional tribal conflicts (for example, clear delineation of water sources and grazing lands belonging to any of the clans). Inclusivity of leadership from the locals, maintained clan system functions while limiting its influence on British administration, which then later became fully responsible for the welfare of the locals. Sheikhs were remunerated for their cooperation and granted limited jurisdiction. This provided an initial system of local courts that retained much of the traditional system for resolving disputes. The sheikhs' authorities were retained as being smaller than that of Islamic judges, who resolved religious and personal status matters pertaining to Islamic law. The British viewed the described roles in local politics and administration by local leadership as an enabler of indirect governance which also added significance to clan leadership and elders who played managed local government from while being a link between the appointed county commissioner and population. Citizens within Protectorates were receiving governance lessons, experiences from Western powers and clan structural operations (Simmons, 2014: 13).

An important evidence of the clan's political agility was their ability to play the role of colonial officer. This aspect of Somali opportunism developed from harsh arid and semi-arid climatic conditions in which it was imperative that men did not miss the opportunity to obtain power and profit. Drysdale (2000) described Somali's strong power desires, which did not materialize. Migdal also referred to elders being strong men due to their roles in colonial Africa. Through ethnic groups and kinships, elders were capable of undermining central control of society. This enabled the colonialists to install more powers for them to reach their level of colonial ambitions. Both colonialists and clans played survival strategies (Drysdale, 2000: 14).

The bureaucratic Italian colonizers were extremely distinct to the British rule. Bureaucracy was ineffective and; it failed to involve the locals in de facto government.

Most of its principles were prevalent of indigenous' rights, discriminated locals and favored colonialists. Lack of proper representation and the Italians' administration by elders (except at the lower level) created a strong state and disrupted Somalis' survival, causing them to be weakened (Lewis, 2002: 110).

Italians were different from the British in terms of governance. Italians exercised the hardliner approach, while British adopted a linear and soft approach of governance. Italian practiced cruel form of rule consisting of racist politics and forced labor. Italians rule of Somali colony exploited the country's economy and infrastructure for their own selfish gains, while weakening the locals survivability by enacting unfavorable policies and forcing social control from a central state (Migdal, 1988: 125). In total contrast to the Italians, the British advanced roads, uplifted the security forces, urban areas, law and order, whereas the Italians at the south did less for the community (Simmons, 2014: 15).

Somali genesis of nationalism came from the war initiated by 'Mad Mullah' or Sheikh Sayyed. A greater North-South interaction with the world and spreading Western education led to formation of organized nationalist groups. A few leaders in Western administrative posts held secret talks with Somalis and Italians, but with time, Italians stopped formation of national groups, enforced monopolization of control over groups and clans, and disallowed mobilization of groups. But after World War II, the south organized its society after the defeat of the Italians. British saw the emergence of the Somali National Assembly (SNS) in 1935. SNS was an outfit formed by local traders and civil servants. The aim of the group was to educate against and rebuke clan rivalries. Shortly after SNS, was formed, another group was developed in 1937, which was called the Federation of Somali Officials (FSO). FSO promoted inclusivity of Somalis in civil service, which was occupied by Arabs' and Indians' scribes (Louis, 1955: 114).

The British targeted hiring on quality as opposed to Italian administration's discriminatory employment of Italians and non-Somalis. Economic success depended on emerging bureaucracy entailing both local clan elders and British government, with the British stepping down after independence (Tripodi, 1999: 55). Oddly enough, because the British authorities followed its model of enforcing a smaller and weaker state presence among the local clan leaders, its indirect approach was advantaged by

successful social control that was causing the clan leadership to diminish. After the Italian master's defeat, the inhabitants of the South collaborated with the British. Local clan leadership was integrated into state functions, which inspired legitimacy of weak state. The British tried as much as possible to reverse Italy's subjugate suppression of clan structure using powerful colonial state, and the fact that it did not succeed in social controlling of Somalis (Tripodi, 1999: 55).

Following the interview with different respondents, the data analysis of the responses to the questions concerning the causes of the collapse of the government of Somalia discovered that there were various reasons for the causes of the collapse of the Somali government. General Jarabi, the military advisor to the Somali embassy in Turkey, believes that the country's collapse stems from external interference and the protection of foreign interests by local politicians. General Garabey added that divisions among Somali politicians who held high positions in the country also frustrated all efforts towards unity. *Garabey argued; the contradiction of colonial administrative systems has a negative impact on the traditional Somali administration, which also has a share of the blame in the failure of the state. On the other hand, WARSAW, and NATO forces compete for the control the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia. Furthermore, the colonialist's main interest was to control the Berbera and Kismayo ports whose strategic location connects the African and Asian continents. A Russian-led foreign intervention aimed at uniting Somalia and Ethiopia into one socialist country, mediated by Cuban President Fidel Castro, was divided over a political dispute between Russia and the United States. All these factors and the assassination of Somali President Abdul Rashid Ali Sharmarke were the main factors behind the failure of the Somali state (Garabey, 2020).*

I further spoke to Mohamed Mursal, the Director of the Presidential Palace in Southwestern State of Somalia, and I interviewed him about the causes of the collapse of the state. This is because the South Western state (*Koonfur-Galbeed*) is one of the Federal administration States of Somalia which has suffered slow progress due to lack of enough support and its large population. Director Mursal suggested:

Historically, the pre-colonial local Somali authorities in the Horn of Africa lacked sufficient understanding of modern governance system. Apart from some of the remnants of Portuguese and Arabs who had a different administration in their own territories, these people were pastoralists who relocated more often as they sought water and pasture. After the arrival and entry of the colonialists to the territories of Somalia, even before teaching the importance of advanced government structures, and building the social contract between the citizens and government they immediately enforced the European governance system which later transformed the traditional administration of the pastoral community. At this juncture, the Somali sultans started rebelling against Europeanization, while even labelling the Europeans as 'infidels' from that point the misunderstanding of the colonials appeared. The confrontation with the leadership including the Muslim Imams reached its peak, thus starting to weaken all efforts of the administration (Mursal, 2020).

The third respondent, Salah Sheikh, Former Minister of Public Works, current leader of the Justice and Unity party mentioned tribalism as the root cause of the destruction of Somalia and the key obstacle to a functional government. Salah Sheikh added that Somalia is influenced by and established upon three traditions; the camel culture (based on camel rustling and murder), politicians and colonialism. Salah continued to argue that the other major influencers of failure of the Somali governance is as follows

Before the colonial era, Somalia was a peaceful territory. The local community rulers were elected on a clan-based system. After the Berlin Conference, the imperialists decided to partition and scramble for the horn African countries. Whoever resisted the colonial administration was killed or imprisoned. Using some Somali ties to the colony, over a million Digil and Mirifle clans were killed in Kassel.

The colonists leveraged the camel boys to colonize and to exploit Somali farmland resources, after which the regime turned into a tyrannical culture between camel culture and farmers who were traditionally in conflict (Osam, 2020).

Current and previous politicians who responded to the interview questions mainly blamed colonialism for the collapse of the Somali state, noting that colonial

powers indeed destroyed the Somali system of administration without providing a lasting solution. The colonialists eradicated the sultanates and replaced the traditional Somali system of governance with a European administrative system. The policies and enforcements contradicted the Somali administrative system that was mainly based on religion and cultural beliefs, and the finding of the interviews largely shows that colonialism has played a major role in the collapse of Somali states. Furthermore, senior government officials in Somalia expressed ideological differences with some wanting democratic rule and others seeking a coup with the support of world Super powers. They are engaged in establishing political ties with the world's major powers. At the time, when the coup occurred after the second election in 1967, and socialist rule succeeded in controlling Somali military issues, the country lost donor support since some countries started to cut international aid due to Somalia's involvement in civil wars (Osam, 2020).

In contrast, the director of the presidency in southwestern Somalia Mohamed Mursal believes that the key collapse of the state results from Somali administrative personnel and that colonialism has only played a facilitator role. On the other hand, some participants pointed out that *the collapse of the Somali state is not solely based on colonialism because the colonialists were only mediators. Furthermore, they did not dominate in leadership or rule the government from the top to the bottom. The highest executive was composed of Somali officials, the parliament was mainly constituted of Somali legislators, and all the staff largely consisted of Somalis. We have no reason to regularly blame the colonialists as the cause of the collapse of the Somali state. The only reason why we accuse the colonialists is because of our choice of the charming Italian tutelage related to delusion and ignorance with the Somali political parties. At that time, the Italians were neither rich nor strong economically, and their administration was fascist* (Mursal, 2020).

3.5.1. The Trusteeship Period of the Somali Governance (1950-1960)

Italy scrambled for Somalia using a treaty with the Sultan of Zanzibar, and settled in commercial areas like Mogadishu, *Marka*, and *Barava* ports and some agricultural places. In 1924, the British government ceded to Italy the Juba land province of Kenya including the port of Kismayo. By 1927, the Italians had established

administration control over *Hobbyo* and *Majeertenia* sultanates and ruled south part of Somalia. The United Kingdom, Soviet Union and France leaders, and representative met in 1945 in London to discuss the disposal of the former Italian colonies including Somalia, and after failing to agree in 1948, they referred the matter to the United Nations two days later. It was not until November 21, 1949 that the General Assembly placed Somalia under International Trusteeship with Italy as the Administering Authority. In 1950, the assembly approved the trusteeship Agreement and Italy assigned the responsibility of guiding Somalia towards self-statehood within ten years (Ware, 1965: 174).

Unfortunately Italy had inadequate economic and financial resources required for the establishment of a stable Somali governance structure and economy. Italian officials failed to clearly understand the complexity of Somali's clan system. Italy underestimated the negative impact of imposing Western model of governance in Somali, and established a centralized state system that relied on the Italian experience in the 1940s, which proved unsatisfactory as a foundation for Somali's government structure. In 1955, very little had been achieved, with the economy being relied to pave way to political independence by 1960 (Mortimer, 1993: 20). Under the agreement, the AFIS reported that the United Nations required a new administration be established for political institutions; expand education, and free local press and opposition rights. Italians were the source of nationalist and the SYL did not trust a new administration, which would mask Italians agenda (Ware, 1965: 20).

AFIS imprisoned several SYL members, expelled civil services, which led to protest before the United Nations with the conflict lasting for 3 years (1950-1953). A new political and economic initiative was established to guide the two parties on Somali nationalists (Mortimer, 1993: 20). Most African liberation leaders established their liberation parties that led to independence. African systems were democratically organized. Nevertheless, Somali Youth League (SYL) and Hizbiya Dighil & Milrifle had traditional clan approaches in governing statehood and democratic elections (Samatar, 2016: 39).

3.5.2. The Rise of Multi-Party System in Somalia

Thirteen Somali youths established a youth club as a movement with the agenda of achieving political freedom from colonial rulers 1943. Most of those members were unpleasant in politics because of their feeling about the devastating effect of colonization. Although there was a prohibition from the political engagement of political parties with the British condition, the SYL by-laws were civic education, and oaths that prevented them from being used by Europeans to achieve their agenda, furthermore, the membership oath was like this:

“I swear by Almighty God that I will not take any action against any Somali. In trouble, I promise to help the Somali. I will become the brother of all other members. I will not reveal the name of my tribe in matters of marriage I will not discriminate between the Somali tribes and the Midgan, Yibirh, Yaha and Tomals” (Samatar, 2016, p. 39).

SYL party did not welcome the international trusteeship under Italian administration, but the main opposition parties supported trusteeship under Italy for three decades. Although the government at that time was established upon clannish states or tribal leadership, they gained modern applications in governance throughout from colonial era to trusteeship period in 1950 and after independence. During the establishment of political parties and movement to independence, everything among the community took a tribal approach, as leaders were involved to guide their respected members to the formation of statehood (Ware, 1965: 76).

Political party membership in Somalia increased from 38,567 in 1950 to 62,509 in 1954. The exceptions to this awakening were the nomads whose noninvolvement in politics made the political life of Somalia uncertain. The United Nations Advisory Council to Somalia was apprehensive about the impact of a possible increase in the number of electors on political power structure. Nomads respond to the wishes of their chiefs rather than to political leaders, thereby raising important issues in Somali political development, including undertaking census for a democratic government, with demands for federal government. The HDMS sought decentralization and federalism, which was motivated by later justified, and fear of powerful being dominated by nomadic clans.

The rejection of the proposal by Somali Youth League in 1956 was due to the fears of *Dighil* and *Mirifle* outnumbering Darood that claimed to be the largest clan. Somalia has failed to conduct accurate census for many years due to political division (News, 2011).

The inexperience of the political parties about modern elections and international politics extended the suffrage of Somalis by separating municipal elections from the general elections. Whereas the 1954 elections were based on universal male suffrage, the 1958 elections were based on universal suffrage whereby women were allowed to contest and seek elective public offices cast their votes for their preferred leaders. The October 1958 Municipal Elections and March 1959 General Elections of marked the most difficult periods in Somalia's electoral and political history. The government proposed to the legislative Assembly an electoral law that provided for the distribution of 90 seats among all Somali parties who were in the process of state building. The HDMS, leading the opposition parliamentary group, and feeling insecure about the future implications of the election opposed the electoral law until the Constitution was completed and a new census was undertaken. After massive negotiations and compromises between government and the Legislative Assembly, some changes were adopted and through secret ballot, voting was made with an outcome of 32 against 20; and thus, a date for an election was fixed to be March 1959 (United Nations Trusteeship Council, 1959: 338).

On the period of the general election, campaigns were made based on strong criticism from the opposition against the government and Italian administration. Crises and confrontations occurred in many territories between the government and the opposition parties. On 23rd February 1959, a bomb was thrown in front of "Bar Azan" and another in the "Italian Tennis Club" where Italians were injured, and this resulted in imprisonment of thousands of opposition party members. Another incident was the violent disorders in Mogadishu, where an individual was murdered, and several civilians injured. The Commissioner of Mogadishu was stabbed by three officers and four soldiers among the police force were seriously injured. The police incarcerated 280 persons including 112 women. The heads of the opposition parties were arrested and headquarters were closed (Mukhtar, 1989: 87-88). Opposition boycotted elections when SYL obtained majority of the seats, which was 83 out of 90. Thereby SYL formed the

second government of Somali under the premiership of Abdullah Isa (Mukhtar, 1989: 87-88).

The HDMS party representatives boycotted the 1959 general election, but their mark remained that they achieved significant results in the first of general election (1956) and the second municipal elections (1958). In many opinions, HDMS would have won very few seats out of the total of 90 seats being contested for. As there was an agreement between some parties with the colonial administration, there was a plan to transfer all government functions to a duly constituted independent government of the territory. Italy continued keeping foreign relations with Somalia. Italy pledged to cover the budget of the Somali government by giving 100 scholarships and promising to buy Somali products such as Bananas (Mukhtar, 1989: 345).

3.5.3. Assessing the Constitution-Making Process in Somalia

To explain the constitutional reforms towards reforming Somalia back to a functioning state comes by learning from the era of the non-constitutional state. The colonizers and dictators in Somalia have used different types of governance, which have led to a failed state. Italy, for example, was not widely acceptable in the colonization of Africa, and its presence in Somalia as a colonial country makes it a factor for the continuation of the failure of the state. After Somalia gained its independence in 1960, a dictatorial approach was used in governing the country. Many governments such as Somalia, which experienced power transitions through a coup (in this case 1969); have experienced backward progression in terms of governance. The then president of Somalia destroyed inclusivity by abolishing clans and enforcing authoritarian rule with a centralized government that pushed for socialism (Harper, 2012: 224).

It is not the first time Somalia has held a constitutional referendum. An example of a referendum was held on the July 20, 1961. The main characteristics of the 1961 Constitution included the formation of government with a democratically framed parliament, prime minister's position, cabinets, and a president's position. The assassination of President Abdirashid in 1969 led to a military coup. The Supreme Revolutionary Council took power with General Mohamed Siad Barre assuming the country's command, while arresting former government officials, banning multiparty

democracy, dissolving parliament, the Courts, and suspending the state's Constitution (Somalia, 1690).

Until the constitutional referendum, the process of 25th of August 1979 saw reforms replacing the 1961 one-party state with a presidential system of government. The constitution was voted by 99.78% of voters and promulgated in 1979, with Barre's Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party in power. The presidential system allowed the president to be both the head of state and government; to possess the power of selecting members of Ministers and chairing all gatherings; serving for a six-year renewable term, being declared president with a 2/3-majority vote at the legislature. These extreme reforms instigated the overthrowing of Barre. An introduction of a provisional government in 1979 replaced his system of government (Legum, 1979: 521).

It is also important to point out that the Somali legal system was largely based on Sharia law. There was no independent judiciary and this led to human rights violations. The collapsed government increased constitutional disorder, an act that indicates the lack of state machinery and an earlier indicator of a state failing or collapsing. Clan-based political alliance attempted to control the country, with 1991 seeing some regions declared formation and separation from the Great Somalia. The Republic of Somaliland declared independent from Somalia, followed by Puntland region, which declared formation of an autonomous region in Northeast in 1998. However, the two are yet to earn recognition from the international community (Legum, 1979: 521).

4. THE FAILURE OF GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN POST-INDEPENDENT SOMALIA

4.1. The Independent Republic of Somalia

Somalia achieved independence on 1 July 1960 and united the two Somali regions to form a unitary and democratic republic. Adan Abdullah Osman was elected as the first provisional president who in turn appointed Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister. This process made Somalia to be branded ‘Switzerland of Africa’ for continuously handing over of power by all preceding heads of state since its first elections. The formation of the Somali Republic established national values. Despite Somalia being an independent country, it faced three devastating challenges, including inheritance of two contrasting colonial systems of administration, which required reforms and integration; incapacitated and impoverished population with low literacy level; and finally, lumpen elite, most of whose members failed to understand how modern government institutions operated or the centrality of building a public sphere that was autonomous from sectarian political projects (Kaariye, 2017: 51).

The Southern and Northern Somalia were institutionally separated, which was based on the previous Italian and British colonial boundaries, with a different administration; as well as different legal, and education systems that were conducted in different languages and procedures. Moreover, police force, exchange rates, taxes, and currencies were different. They had different economic and social interests. However, in 1960, the two formed a singular government. The UN’s Integration Advisory Committee, chaired by Contini Paolo, conducted a gradual integration of new legal systems and institutions settling of differences for three year (1960-1963). The Advisory Board encamped Somalis and the predecessor was working under chairmanship of Marina. The south still believes the Italian experience they gained was better organized, while the north was reluctant to acknowledge the dealing in Mogadishu (Metz, 1992: 26).

Dissatisfied with the distribution of power among clan families, these two regions namely (Southern and Northern Somalia) continued to exist after independence. They argued to separate the north and south. 1962 saw the leadership of Haji

Muhammed Hussein exploiting northern dissatisfaction by establishing an amalgamated party named 'Somali Democratic Union', which noted the protest on lack of Northern delegates in coalition government. Haji failed to solve the conflict until 1962 when Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and an SNL minister took SNL's followers to Somali National Congress, which gained a lot of support from the north and south after enlisting by SYL and Hawiye Clan. The country then boasted of three national political parties, which worked for the unity of the North and South (Metz, 1992: 26). Based on my personal observations and literature review, the causes of the failure of governance on Somali involves many factors including the political tribalism that focuses clan's interest, lack of compatible law of the unification of great Somali regions, the war with Ethiopia and finally the Somali cultural system which fueled the destruction of the government (Abdi, 2010: 33). Before colonial advent into Somalia, self-governance sultanates like small federates, who had political relationship with neighboring countries and the Arab world existed in Somalia (Saciid, 2020). The country had better economic and military institutions. Upon their arrival, the colonial masters enforced an independent centralized government that was in complete contradiction to Somalis' traditional governance processes and importantly direct disconnect between traditional and centralized governance which created failure in clan traditional structure, politics and economic environment after-colonial Somalian state formation (Hersi, 2017: 9)

Clan conflict over resources and power sharing were traditionally settled with legal governance system known as (*Heer*) (Saciid, 2020). During trusteeship period and after independence, majority of Somalian population migrated to urban regions. However, with the arrival of colonization and colonial government, fewer people abused and used leadership to control state resources, economic resource, political interest, government resources, tribal and clan interests and weapons (Ingiris, 2017). Interestingly, Somalia had 2/3 of police-station chives coming from the same clan, which showed that government misused power and involved in corruption. Relating to Somali government policy, police and army were used for personal gains such as excessive force against the Lelkase and Ayr tribes (Ioan, 2002: 1-18).

4.2. Siad Barre's Dictatorship in Italian Postcolonial Review

A military coup including the murder of Somali president Abdi Rashid Ali Sharmarke occurred in the country following the conflict between North and South Somalia due to the appointments of some military commando. Thereafter the newly established administration experienced tribal-based conflicts in 1969 because of the increasing rebellion against the tyrannical rule. The military regime later lasted for 20 years and this political transition was seen as a mark for a dictatorial history after the independence (Payton, 1980: 493).

Inside this political situation, there were a lot of issues such as North Somali administration issues and some tribes accusing the administration. First of all, Barre's style of governance got its inspiration from scientific socialism by the Soviet Union. The principle's slogan was "Socialism unites, tribalism divides" (Mari & Solis, 2018: 2). The Siad Barre regime eventually turned out to be supported by inter-clan faction called 'MOD', from the initials of the three clans composing both Barre's family and government (Marehaan, Ogaden and Dulbahante). Siad Barre's government was heavily questioned as the force of reconstructions of conflicts, hegemonic force or ideologically of MOD clan rivalry which fueled war. Barre's reign used censorship, propaganda, and repression. Gabriele Proglio describes Barre's dictatorship as being violent and a big hindrance to all forms of human rights as the government muzzled privacy, and freedom of speech (Kapteijns, 2013: 236). Siad Barre's dictatorship staged and deconstructed conflicts. Paradoxically, collective and public space was erased and repressed by the regime (Kapteijns, 2013: 236). Migration and exile led to the reconstruction of an 'imaginary homeland', during and after Barre rule. Such example is quoted as:

"In a country where language has always been treated as a political good, literature, being the work of writers involved in the nation-building process, has become one of the markers of the political evolution of the nation and, for those able to decode it, the revealing symptom of its progressive entropy. This writing, which has been intended, since the beginning, as a form of civic engagement, has rapidly evolved into a celebration of the regime, forcing free writers to exile, even before Barre's demise, to

regain the authentic territories of the imaginary. Exile affects 90% of the educated people and endangers the future of modern Somali literature, as well as the democratic evolution of the country” (Rushdi, 1991).

4.3. The Ogaden War

After the military coup in 1969, instead of channeling their focus towards development and democracy, Somali leaders conducted constant wars against internal and external enemies. Examples of such wars include the Ethiopia-Somalia war between 1976 and 1978 over Ogaden region, an area which is located between Ethiopia and Somali. President Mohamed Siad Barre led a guerrilla war without the support of Russia and lack of international recognitions, which lately failed (Weiss, 1980: 8).




Figure 3.1. Map of Ogaden Region (TRT World, 2017).

Some of the characteristics of the government included the establishment of a one-party state, which was driven by a communist political ideology, and the establishment of one leader led state or a non-democratized system of government. Russia later diverted its support from Somalia to Ethiopia in the Somali-Ethiopian war

after Somali refused not to attack Ethiopian troops in the Somalia region (Samatar, 2016: 1).

On the other hand, Ethiopian forces backed by the help of Cuban and Moscow army attacked the Somali army, which suffered heavy losses and were driven out of Ogadenian territory. It was later established that the war caused the death of eight thousand Somalian armed forces and the destruction of over half of Somali Air Force planes. In 1979, almost half of the one million and three hundred thousand refugees settled in the northern Somalia as IDPs with the rest being refugees (Ahmed & Reginald, 1999: 113).

In November 1977, the Somali government confirmed that the war was not only between Ethiopia and Somalia and the Ministry of Defense obtained pictures of aircraft belonging to East Germany and the Cuban state participating in the war between Ethiopia and Somalia. This information was also confirmed by some other countries such as America. Since that time, the war became between the Somali republic government and the Warsaw allies. Since this war was not an easy battle, some international news agencies saw that the Somali forces became one of the strongest forces around the world that confronted Warsaw forces (Qasim, 2019: 97). After this news reached Somalia, the government took many critical decisions against the countries that participated in the battle. In the following, I have listed the highest decisions taken by the Somali Republic government.

1. In response to the Cuban government's participation in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia, the Somali government decided to shut down the Cuban embassy, while also giving Cuban employees a 24 hours ultimatum to leave the country.
2. The Somali government ordered the members of the Russian Advisory Committee who have been in the country for more than 10 years, and numbering more than 7,000 advisers to leave Somalia within a period not exceeding 48 hours.
3. The Somalia government ordered a total lockdown of Russia's military base in Somalia's Berbera city.

Although the Somalia war of 1977 against the Ethiopian state was not legitimate and had some political and strategic flaws, the Somali army succeeded by 70% in controlling the battlefield (Qasim. 2019: 98).

4.4. Impunity in Somalia

Building Somalia is drafted and agreed upon in its constitution, which makes the document extremely critical to its return to civil liberty, democratic governance, and rule of law in future. With a rise in the number of Islamist groups, the constitution's debate is concerned with Islam and the Sharia law. It is necessary to structure the constitution towards democratic equality, capturing political representation based on clans and sub-clans, which leads to the question of whether this would form a model for democracy which gives room to freely held elections and fair representation. This will be possible with improvements on voting rights, mass voter registration, and an effective national electoral commission. Before executing the military coup, the President and his "supreme revolutionary council" gathered for the amendment of the Somalia legal system. The coup regime assigned all budgetary, legislative, executive and judicial forces to the Supreme Transitional Council while also suspending the 1961 constitution (Menkhaus, 2007: 27).

In 1973 a single civilian code was adopted by the regime. The Sharia and Somali customary laws were greatly curtailed by its rules surrounding succession, personal contracts and water-grazing privileges. In fact, the new civil code altered Diya's traditional payment scheme as punishment for death or disability, which the clan jointly assumes blame for it. Crime related murders were punished by death and punishment was limited to immediate relations. The abandonment of socialism as the basis of government in 1988 did not result in the independence of the judiciary from the executive branch of government. Corruption and repressive practices were rampant. The legacy of Siad Barre's rule has persisted to this day, including public perceptions that the judicial system is a toothless tool in the hands of ruling elites and their clan patrons to advance personal interests, suppress opposition leaders and groups, and dispossess non-ruling and non-elite clans (Menkhaus, 2007: 27).

Opposition groups against the dictatorial rule suffered murder or life imprisonment and loss of property. An example of that was the killing of *Eynaashe and Salaad Gabeyre*, and the shooting of Somali religious scholars who accused that the family law confronts some verses of the Holy Quran. After intimidation from the government, most of the Somali scholars and opposition political parties tried to flee the country and migrated to other countries out of fear of the dictatorial punishment which was very painful (Cariif, 2019: 45).

4.5. Somalia's Foreign Policy toward the Soviet Union and the West

After the Second World War, the world was separated into two groups, either with the American capitalist western camp (NATO) or with the eastern Soviet socialist camp (WARSAW). Somalia, in its beginnings, sided with the Soviet socialist camp, and Somalia had great relations with the Soviets' to the extent that the Soviets launched a military base in the city of Berbera. The other factor is that Somalia has a strategic location south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and overlooks the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea (Al-Jabarti, 2017).

Egypt was another Soviets ally and thus the Soviet Union had partners in the northern southern parts of the Red Sea. This was until the Egyptian leader Muhammad Anwar Sadat decided to end the Egyptian-Zionist conflict and held talks (Camp David), thus joining the Western camp. Egypt became an influential member of the “Safari Club”. To date, information about the Safari club and its role in Somalia remains scanty. This club was a team made up of several intelligence services, belonging to several countries, whose mission was combating “communism” in Africa and the Middle East.

After the outbreak of the Somalia and Ethiopia wars in 1977, the Soviets sided with Ethiopia. Upon Ethiopia’s hesitation over the honesty of the Soviet Union as both Somalia and Ethiopia were his allies, and to avoid biasness of the Soviet to one of the two parties, the Ethiopian government offered tempting offers to entice the Soviets to side with him, including giving him (military bases) on the coast of Eritrea, as a substitute for its base in Berbera Somalia; buying Soviet products in hard currency as the Soviets were their days in rubles. Indeed, they were not recognized in the world at that time, they were looking for markets to sell their products first, and to obtain hard

currency secondly. On the other hand, Somali government severed its ties with the Soviet Union and closed Russia's military base in Berbera as a consequence of Soviet's role in the war between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia sided with the Western camp, and Somalia's relations improved with the anti-communist countries in the Middle East. The nation formally joined "Safari Club" causing the Ethiopian government, in cooperation with the Soviet Union, to fund the Somali opposition fronts after they studied the Somali social and clan structure well. Since Somalia, at that time, sided with the Western capitalist camp and their allies in the Middle East, it is natural that those camps will make economic and investment contributions to Somalia (Al-Jabarti, 2017).

During the period of the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied weapons illegally to opposition clan groups in order to destroy the Somalia military. After the collapse of the dictatorship regime in 1991, clan administration replaced him and clan rivalries and clashes followed placing Somalia's military weapons in the hands of the warlords after the state collapsed.

Intervention from Western countries failed to disarm the people thus seeing a continuation of anarchy in society. The fall of the Siad Barre regime left Somali stateless, and Somalia was divided into self-governed regions. The main effort to rebuild Somali's governance was and is still problematic due to the politics structured on clan. The Cold War was a period when East-west composited for influence of the War-torn country (Irwin, 2003: 134).

4.6. Interest Driven Crises

The prolonged and complex Somalian crises falls into two distinct categories: The first category refers to the fact that the crisis persisted since the main ruling Somali groups benefited from the prolonged crisis; and that most diplomats assumed their understanding of the Somali crisis, ranging from peace-building workshops and national reconciliation programs fostering understanding and communication. The second and final category was that protracted Somalian crisis and how it served the interests and goals of the main non-governmental actors. The increasing drive of personal interest through creating conflicts by the dictators fortified the duration of the crisis.

Lawlessness continued because this was the outcome the main players sought (Menkhaus, 2003: 414).

The parties reaping from the conflict approached peace as a better option that could benefit them more than they benefited from the conflict. By 1991, the center of power sought to be addressed by political actors. Clan leadership and political organizations such as Somali National Alliance, Somali National Front, and United Somali Congress vanished, thus leaving the major political party enjoying central power in a converged manner. However, after the toppling of the dictatorship, tribal elders gradually ascended to authority, while civil society increased their roles towards powerful and peaceful service as opposed to past years (Menkhaus, 2003: 414).

Despite the rise and fall of fortune of certain non-government actors, there is one fact that has remained constant: a wide number of players lack the power influence and shape peace and government despite their high authority in derailing political projects that they do not approve. In current Somalia, widespread communal mistrust and lamentations coupled with pessimistic attitude towards the revival of central state and dangerously-armed population mostly unemployed gunmen, weak and corrupt social authority has caused much harm in the peacemaking initiatives.

Through joint peace initiatives, Sharia courts have been rescued from the grasp of the militants, warlords and tribal leaders. Large segments of society have the powers to veto state building, peace building, and law, which frustrate negotiations efforts (Menkhaus, 2003: 415).

Mediators are thus forced to compromise with all proposed formulas that are acceptable and agreeable to a wide range of actors, some of whom have less or no legitimacy of attending peace conferences but retain sufficient authority and capacity to hold the state-building process in ransom. There are many external parties that have interests and powers to derail political initiatives that they disapprove, thus making power-brokering agreements more difficult. Spoilers of peace building can be found in three groups, with the first group involving individuals or clans seeking to undermine state building or peace-building because they are not satisfied with their share of the pie, with an example of the peace talks in Eldoret, Kenya, which was complicated by

controversy over levels of clan representation. They are circumstantial spoilers with greed and they do not have interest to the nation (Menkhaus, 2003: 415).

The second group is composed of spoilers consisting of war criminals and other armed groups, arms merchants, individuals in government whose key interests remain in inciting chaos and using arms and remain interested in the production, mobilization and allocation of economic resources to sustain a conflict (eg, taxation, commerce or looting) More complex spoilers of peace and nation building mean risk avoiders. Despite the fact that they benefit from state and peace but face huge uncertainties and fear of a development that impacts their interest. They prefer optimum and safe means to nullify initiatives of change and peace with the aim of supporting those that favor them. Some business leaders within Mogadishu have historically sabotaged transitional government (Malone & Berdal, 2000: 15-19).

4.7. Interest in Protracted Conflict

Groups benefiting from armed conflicts have significantly changed over time. Between 1990 and 1992, a large section of interest groups benefited out of armed and humanitarian crisis that they had created. Warlords' threats and violence in maintaining institutional support sought conflicts and conquest to provide war booty for their militia, and sparked famine to attract relief agencies and food aid that became a major source of income. Militias overthrew authorities by pillaging residential areas and government buildings. Mercenaries and armed traders benefited from diverting food aid, exporting scrap metal and engaging in illicit weapons trade. This scenario raised alarm at UN level causing the UN Security Council issue condemnation over a "significant increase" in the flow of weapons to and through Somalia in violation of a 1992 arms embargo and voted unanimously to keep monitoring weapons trafficking in the poor and lawless Horn of Africa nation. Some clans looted valuable real estate and riverside lands through armed conquest, thus prolonging the struggle and conflicts (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

In the post-United Nations Assistant Mission of Somalia era, war-provoking constituencies have shrunk. The progressive decline in war in Somalia indicates a potential causal link between interests and conflict. Warlords' power to encourage wars is diminished, but not extinguished, as businesspeople and their own war-weary clans

lose their financial support. Plundering resources are far more restricted and militia incentives are reduced to battle. Businesspersons who benefited from war have conducted partially legitimate trade, and have fixed valuable assets that they speculate to be transferred at post war periods. They are more interested in peace as opposed to war. Some could be indulged in questionable and illegal activities for commercial gains, but not severely. They have gradually learned that war is unhealthy for their businesses (Tilly, 1985: 169).

Interests precipitating armed conflict are becoming less in comparison to previous years. Interests are shifted towards peace and suspension of arms related conflicts. War is no longer a legitimate tool as used to be in the period of crisis. That Somalia is experiencing more insecurity and armed clashes than at any time since 1996 is the fact that these are, for the most part, very narrow and politically motivated clashing interests and thus narrowing number of non-governmental actors (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

The interests in chaos changed since the 1990s when gradual emphasis was increased over young militants and tribal elder's role increasingly applying to customary law on conflict resolution. Young gunmen (*mooryaan*) who wore shirts with an emblem inscribed under the slogan "I am the President" can no longer make this claim and are likely to be held accountable by their clan for theft and murder. Somali militants declined and this includes the disappearance of young gunmen (*mooryaan*) (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

Business interests and opportunities changed to cross-border, cross regional, large-scale. Non-extorting environment, remittance-supported service economy, and safety sectors are interested in predictable economic and trade-based economy. Security is more privatized for those that can afford armed guards' protection (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

The year 1999 witnessed that popular Mogadishu business people and warlords split in disagreements over the payment of taxes at militia roadblocks, and the money was used to purchase and hire militiamen from warlords with several being contracted by the Sharia courts. In this period, the business community had realized the importance

of state security, which allowed businesses to thrive. This continued until 1999 and 2000 when Transitional National Government got formed in addressing street crimes. Merka city road, Mogadishu Bakara Market, and southern Mogadishu were protected by using this approach. In this approach, rule of law and impunity coexisted simultaneously as state was not present to check crimes. Powerful constituencies became protected and criminality was controlled in contrast to lower class societies that didn't have capacity to tackle crimes, incitement, violence, land grabbing, piracy, slavery, theft, corruption, drug trafficking, embezzlement of tax, and aid funds. Local Sharia courts through independent judiciary and police capacity prosecuted economic and political crimes (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

Some constituencies were unfairly served by sharia courts. The laws and courts countered bandits, who surrendered their theft and blackmail practices in such an environment. Insurgents who earned their livelihood by providing security for international agencies and wealthy businesspersons found their source of income at risk if the crime is completely eliminated. Some warlords may work in silence to undermine Sharia courts because they represent a rival political gathering of businesspersons, elders, and clerics. Modernization and application of Sharia courts completely manages warlords. These groups represent a small percentage of the population but mostly have veto powers towards local efforts of imposing rule of law. Usually, they do this by undermining local confidence in Sharia courts through clever manipulation of the clan, and sometimes a certain level of collusion between rival gangs or militias occur. Those whose enmities toward one another have been set aside in a common case is a greater threat. It is one of the reasons why criminality and extortion still exists in most parts of south Somalia despite the efforts by sheikhs, Sharia courts, and others (Menkhaus, 2003: 416).

4.8. Actors as Strong as the Government

Over the years, foreign powers have micro-managed various sectors of Africa through the use of their wealth and strength to exercise supremacy. This was partly due to the fact that the continent is known for its abundance of raw materials, and natural resources such as oil and minerals, strategic and geopolitical significance for logistical

and war-related purposes. Somalia has been targeted owing to its possession of Africa's second largest coastline just behind Madagascar and for its geographical and strategic location.

The Horn of Africa, one of the continent's pearls and favorites was the first region to be invaded by foreign powers. As a result, the region was divided between the British, French and Italy as part of the scramble and partition of Africa. This artificial partition, which later became a reality, has had a significant impact on the area. That is why, even after independence, these countries fall into a cycle of perpetual conflict and degradation, rather than working together to establish national growth and stability in the region.

The key explanation for the conflict was due to the fact that during the division of the borders, certain European powers drew the borders without taking into account the citizens, the tribe and other facts. This has created a challenging environment for countries to manage their own borders. The Somali tribes living in parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, for example, are the same as the other inhabitants of the Horn of Africa (Osman, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020). Furthermore, the interests and greed of international powers have still lasted even after decolonization, and as a result, they used those new nations as a proxy for their political and economic interests and gains.

4.8.1. UN and other Humanitarian Agencies

Despite the chaos that accompanied the ouster of President Siad Barre, the United Nations resumed its humanitarian activities in Somalia and continuously engaged in that country by March 1991. For the next several months, the uncertain security environment has prompted the United Nations to briefly pull its personnel from Somalia on many occasions. However, it managed to carry out its humanitarian operations to the degree necessary, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross and other local NGOs. The worsening and appalling condition in Somalia compelled the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, to engage effectively in the diplomatic dimensions of the crisis and to push for a negotiated solution to the dispute.

Although UN agencies' intervention in Somalia was for humanitarian related purposes, it was accompanied by a hidden mission based on fulfillment of their interests. UN agencies interfered with all state-building activities whether military training, general elections, militant fighting, and other governmental activities. For example, the headquarters of the UN agencies in Somalia known as *Halane* is a place where Somali government officials require authorization to get entry, yet, what is going on inside the camp is not yet known.

UN agencies engage in importation and exportation from Somali ports without disclosing what the content of what they are exporting and importing. The most recent case of illegal UN interventions in Somalia was in 2018 when the UN Secretary General's Special representative to Somalia ordered for the release of former leader of the Al Shabab terror group, Mukhtar Robow. He was arrested by the Somali federal government due to his relationship with Al Shabab militants. At the time of his arrest, he was a candidate for the Southwest Somali presidency (Osman, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

4.8.2. The Role of the Arab League

Although Somalis and the Arabs do not belong to the same ethnicity, the Somali culture and religious practice is widely associated with Arab countries because of their shared connection. Moreover, Somalia's geographic location places it strategically to transact with Arab countries across the Arabian Peninsula.

Historically, the Somalis traded with the Hindus and the Arabs and exchanged goods whereby the Somalis exported livestock which getting ornaments and spices in return. However, their African counterparts were considered part of Arab cultures. Somalia also joined the League for commercial purposes with the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, which lies across the Gulf of Aden. Therefore, it is not surprising to see Somalia as a member of the Arab League.

At first, Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974 in order to fight the ideologies of Washington and Moscow. This was well explained in the interview with General Garabey arguing the contention between these two super powers. However, in 1977, the Somali government of *Barre* turned towards Moscow by transforming into a one-party

state, thus attracting aid from the Soviets. While counting on the support of the Soviets during the year, Somalia revived its plan of establishing the greater Somalia. In order to realize its plan, Somalia in the following years engaged in wars with Ethiopia in the Ogaden region in order to reclaim its territory. However, the Soviets withdrew their support to back Ethiopia at the expense of Somalia. This made Somalia suffer a devastating defeat against the strengthened Ethiopians. The disaster they experienced as well as the resulting economic consequences turned people against the government. However, more than the disappointment of Moscow, the reaction of some Arab countries angered Somalia (Mursal, Osman, & Garabey, 2020). The governments of Cairo and Riyadh supported Somalia during the war, while Libya supported Ethiopia. As a result, in the following years, Barre severed all ties with Tripoli. This and other events led to the fall of the regime and Barres' government in 1991.

Ethiopian and Libyan governments backed a rebellion against the Somali government leading to the split of the country into two northern and southern parts. This opened the door for the collapse of Somalia as a state. After the failure of the state in 1991, Somalia became a center of rivalry and proxy wars not only between the regional states but also among the Arab League member states. However, Saudi Arabia remained unwilling to provide support to Somalia for long. Moreover, during the recent Qatar blockade, Somalia was expected to join the Saudi and Emirati in siding against Qatar, and in return the Somali government would receive financial aid. However, the current administration rejected the offer and chose to remain neutral. As a result of Somalia's bold decision, the UAE discontinued the military cooperation program between the two countries, which had started in 2014 and included provision of training and payment of salaries to a section of the Somali military personnel.

During the outbreak of the Somali civil war in early 1990s, none of the members of the Arab League was ready to admit Somali refugees. Some nations even deported them back to their countries, while also preventing them from obtaining work permit. However, this was in violation of international law regarding the deportation of refugees from the countries from which they fled. For instance, in one side Saudi Arabia and UAE and in another side Qatar and Turkey that is contesting for building a relationship with Somali government. Somalia's geographical location and its waters is one of the

main factors, which drove and pulled the Arab states to find interest in Somalia similar to previous superpowers' interests to control part of the areas.

Somalia is close to vital oil routes and its ports could also serve landlocked Ethiopia, which has a population of 100 million. Iraq and Iran have intervened in the Horn of Africa to rival each other's influence in the region. Therefore, in 2014, members of the Arab League arrived in Somalia to attend a peace conference in order to try and narrow the gap between the different tribes and form a legitimate government. But each of them was driven by their own interest at their core, not motivated by the need to achieve security in Somalia and the horn of Africa region. Moreover, up to the present time, they have not helped Somalia in any way except for the financial aid they provided to expand their interest in the region and its resources (Osman, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

4.8.3. Islamist Actors: The Resurgence of Religion in Somali Politics

An important feature of these years after the collapse of the central government includes emerging Islamist movement(s) in Somalia in 2006, Islamic court coalitions, and the coalition of warlords in Mogadishu. Militias loyal to the UIC gained public support in June and July 2006 for creating an important degree of security in the capital and expanded their control across most of south-central Somalia in contrast to the failing warlords. Along the same period, The UIC attraction saw 29 ministers defect from the government, urging the powerless Somali administration to reconcile with Islamic militants who have seized the capital, Mogadishu. The Islamic courts started to exercise their authority in moral areas by closing down a Somali radio station, before later allowing it back on the air so long as it does not play music or love songs (The New Humanitarian, 2006).

Ethiopian forces backed by US, intervened Somalia in December 2006 and the UIC were defeated. Following this, Al-Shabaab emerged as an independent entity in reaction to the invasion. By September 2007, the defeated UIC leadership and the defected TFG parliamentarians together with diaspora groups opposed to the presence of Ethiopian troops and its occupation in Somalia, established alliances to increase liberation and spearheaded an insurgency (Gaas & Hansen, 2011: 283-284).

Following this, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized an African Union Peacekeeping Mission (African Union's operations inside the Republic of Somalia) to help protect the TFG. At this point, the UIC remnants and other groups as well as all Somalis including the diaspora groups expressed their opposition to the Ethiopian military presence. Initially, Al-Shabaab gained popularity among the Somalis for opposing and leading a war against Ethiopia. Eventually in June 2008 UN mediated talks between factions of the Alliance of Re-Liberation of Somalia and TFG forced Ethiopia's withdrawal and the establishment of a new TFG in January 2009 in Djibouti led by president sheikh Sharif (former leader of UIC) (Møller, 2009: 1-3).

In 2012 new post-Transitional federal government (TFG) parliament members have been drawn based on the "4.5" formula of power sharing in Somalia and a federal government was put in place. An advanced federal system of regional states was established by local communities. Puntland, Galmudug, Southwest, Hirshabelle, and Juba-land were the newly established regional states under the federal arrangement. In early 2017, a new president as the head of new Somali government was selected by the new parliamentarians. Currently the Somali government lacks the most basic characteristics associated with a sovereign state and therefore exists only as demure concept. Despite the African Peacekeeping Mission for Somali African Union's Operations inside the Republic of Somalia, the federal Somali government lacks the capacity to function and lacks those characteristics associated with a state. Al Shabaab continues to cause havoc and create insecurity across the country, including in Mogadishu (Gaas & Hansen, 2011: 283-284).

4.8.4. The Al-Shabab as an Organization and as Governance Movement

As warlords clashed for territorial dominance in Mogadishu and its environs, several Sharia courts formed a group that gained notoriety. Due to lack of legitimate government, the Sharia courts became the Al-Shabaab (*"the Youth"*) so as to transcend clan politics and took power. It can be earlier suggested that the formation of the Al-Shabaab was to resolve the demand by the population for a governing body to provide security and productiveness of society. Al-Shabaab contained some of the most educated Sharia courts personnel who gained trust and compliance, using religion to drive their

ideology of stability that overshadowed clan systems, demised warlords and replaced Barre government between 1991 and 2006. Gradually, the Al-Shabaab used religion as an instrument of achieving political and personal interests. Local strongmen disguised under religiosity, with pretense of a resurrecting Islamic caliphate to counter western countries. Moreover, they used authoritarian rules similar to their predecessor-Barre. The Al-Shabaab abused power. They also rejected clan system of government (Hanse, 2019: 5).

Ahmed Godane Abdi, a prominent Al-Shabaab, rose ranks and became leader. As a pious religious leader and seasoned veteran Afghanistan war soldier, he tapped social powers, performed guerilla warfare skills and led attacks against rival warlord. By 2009 the Al-Shabaab proved to be a security threat to Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab protected the population in exchange for loyalty. They gave inhuman punishments based on Shariah law to solidify coercive power in their territories. Disloyalty was heavily punished. In 2009, Godane's leadership controlled a huge portion of the country's south (Joseph, 2014: 39).

Al Shabaab's existence was short-lived with the lack of proper governance of actual daily activities of a large area (Hanse, 2019: 83). They also faced global community pressure while AMISOM continued to gain ground against the Al Shabaab, seizing control of major Mogadishu, and another pressure from the US. Many highly ranked Al Shabaab members and fighter were killed in the process. Godane's killing by US drone strike in early September 2014 demoralized the organization's growth. Al Shabaab was weakened by additional combination of forces from African countries, taking their defense to the border of Somalia, which prevented the expansion of Al-Shabaab. Their existence hardly qualifies to be a legitimate government, which was the highest failure of the history of power of the country. Regardless of their control of land, local population and perceived legitimacy using religion, they did not manage to reach state success and social control as they were minimal and failed to function as a state (Joseph, 2014: 39).

Al-Shabaab terror organization and some other militants such as ISIS are among the toughest opponents of the Somali government, thus causing insubordination. Since

the founding of Al-Shabaab in 2006 as part of the larger Al Qaeda network, it has started battling the Somali government in order to reinforce the government's failure. Although the Somali government does not have the strength to control the entire country due to its limited capacity and minimal resources, the militants have found gaps and opportunities to carry out some normal government duties such as collecting taxes from businessmen and non-state actors. For example, the areas of the southwestern state are lands in which these militants settled, and the government has no authority to control these areas, and likewise, the Somali government does not control large parts of the capital city at night, so Al-Shabaab fighters carry out illegal taxations and operations to provide protection to the businesspeople (Osman, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

On the other hand, Al-Shabaab militants have continued to have a large influence in the Somali parliamentary elections. In 2018, some members of the delegates who elected the current parliament were called by Al-Shabaab militants and no one knows the content of the information to the delegates. If those delegates again participate in the coming elections there will be doubts in the new parliament members as to whether those delegates will vote to Al Shabaab militants candidates or not (Osman, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

5. THE CURRENT GOVERNANCE SYSTEM IN SOMALIA

5.1. The 4.5 Power Sharing Formula of Clannism in Somalia

The Somali political structure has been formulated at the Somali Political Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000. Since then, there have been eleven transitional governments, including the current administration. This government was ideologically based on the formula of 4.5 representations. All executive and legislative seats and positions be it ambassadorial, were divided along this formula. If this formula of power sharing is not fully implemented, it would mark the starting point of struggle and fighting among the clans. After intensive struggle among the clan along with the sharing of power in the seats of the parliament, the 4.5 formula has been seen as a solution for the power-sharing among the clans, and the Somali clans had been divided into five groups based on the clan lineages, where the five are the big classes, and the rest group is included all remaining clans who have been seen as small non-effective and poor clans were included (Midgaan, Yibir, Reer Hamar, Jareer Wayne clans). As the failure of the Somali government was somehow based on the clan problems in 1991, this new formula has been based on equality among the clans, followed by the establishment of clannish federalism in the country. Even though new federal member states were initiated in the country, unfortunately, the states were culturally based on clan regions (Jamac, 2018).

The four major clan groups in Somalia are the *Rahaween*, *Dir*, *Hawiye*, and *Darood*. The Dir group also includes the *Ishaq* clan, which is the dominant force in northern Somaliland. The 0.5 group includes a clan or "others" groups but is not limited to *Madhibaan (Midgaan)*, *Yaxar*, *Tumaal*, *Ogeyslabe*, *Yibir*, and other non-Somali ethnic groups such as *Eeyle*, *Jareerweyne* (Somali Bantus), *Reer Xamar*, *Rer Brawi* and *Banadiri* clans and other.

The allocation of a share of 0.5 to "small clans" reflects the general treatment of members of these clans in all aspects of life. For example, many members of the so-called major clans refuse to integrate with the members of the 0.5 groups, so much so that families disavow them if they do. The 4.5 Formula, which was ostensibly intended to provide much-needed stability to Somalia, has been counterproductive and

detrimental to the country's development. Because political power in the country is anchored on the basis of clan affiliation, clan loyalty becomes more important than loyalty to the state and patriotism. The Somali state cannot be revived until citizens will determine how they want to be ruled. Instead of ever having to speak on their behalf a so-called clan representative should allow people to freely express their political choices. Until the Somalis remove the abomination of Formula 4.5, there is no hope for the Somali state. Nobody is responsible, except for the people of Somalia (Jamac, 2018).

5.2. Conflict of Political Tribalism

The politicians who were interviewed reiterated in their responses that the collapse of governance in Somalia is also deeply rooted in the clan-based political system of operation and power sharing which turns clans against each other, leading them to clash and sometimes to fight. This dissertation answers the problem by providing solutions to counter the existing upheavals. As a result of the interview, General Garabey (2020) highlighted that traditional leaders of Somalia such as elders and Imams represent the community members; and that they are the key decision makers about clan issues whether it is concerning internal clan or outside the clan.

Solving resource-driven or related conflicts are the most difficult ones to solve even for the elders since they lack an agreeable answer or sanction to the clan conflict. This is also partly because the conflict is instigated by intrusion of clan affairs by non-resident individuals and parties from different region. As a politician, Garabey highlighted in his speech that there are some regions that suffered from inadequate natural resources including drylands and with little or no rainfall. So, this leads to their emigration from their home regions to far-fetched regions where they gradually start to dominate the host communities or the original residents. This is a recurrent challenge even though the nomadic communities initially sought water and pasture for their livestock and their livelihoods (Osan, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

In his recommendations, General Garabey proposes that judicial institutions need adequate strengthening in order to have the capacity to address resource-related conflicts. He added that the government's role must be based on trust-building among all members of the community. On the other hand, politician Mohamed Mursal denoted that

resolving clan issues remained a very difficult task but added that the community should pay special attention to these issues, including reflecting upon themselves; and how they could get a leader who had the interest of his people at heart (Osan, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

An analysis of the dominant responses of the interviews reveals that political tribalism can be displaced through establishment of a cohesive national conflict reconciliation and integration institutions while closely followed by holding nationwide free, fair, and inclusive elections. In his response, Mursal (2020) argued that it was impossible to draft a constitution within a 20-year period and it is largely due to the fact that of politicians' repudiation in the completion of the draft constitution while having certain political interests such as nepotism, favoritism, and corruption. If injustice is the root cause of the state collapse, then that leaves us with a single solution to this problem; addressing the injustice.

Some of the participants of the survey who hold political positions agreed that they could only help raise awareness about the need to eliminate tribal politics since they had little influence on tribal politics. Government authorities and parties are expected to advocate and support democracy. Moreover, most lawmakers choose a mechanism that has exploitable gaps for their opportunism to explore and control the political affairs. As one legislator explained: "Our duties as politicians are just to increase consciousness in culture and government. Afterwards, it is the government's duty to set up responsible mechanisms to bring an end to this nightmare of territorial politicization and fragmentation" (Osan, Mursal, & Garabey, 2020).

On the other hand, a good number of politicians expressed their disagreements on the existence of repetitive clan driven conflicts in Somalia. They argued that the conflict was based on the scramble for control of water resources and pastures. The abundance of such resources would have meant that there won't be any need for clans to engage in fighting. Politicians, out of their own selfish interest, exploit their tribesmen religious leaders to fulfill their political interests through communal incitement.

This later causes the community members to disengage and detach themselves from governance and politics blaming it for the misfortunes facing the society. They

convert themselves to government critics while highlighting the negative side of the government, and finally, the community withdraws its support for the government's projects (Osam, 2020). Meanwhile, politician Eng. Salah also believes there is no conflict among the Somali community. The problem originates from social and cultural issues:

In Somalia, there are three cultures: the first is the camel boy's culture, the second is the culture of the farmers, and the third is the Banadiri culture. From there, we have seen that camel culture is based on killing one another, and they are not modern people who understand the meaning of modern governance as well as the protection of the locals. Camel herdsman are the people blamed for looting. As a consequence of that, it is difficult to solve those problems while those involved the culprits of looting hold leadership positions themselves. If these cultures are adopted and agreed upon, a strong government can be established in Somalia (Osam, 2020).

All participants were in agreement on the need to spread awareness by educating the communities and government on the fact that tribal politics are a stumbling block to good governance, cohesion, and the lasting unity of the Somali people.

The social structure of the tribe could not be disowned or discredited, but its involvement in politics pulls strong ill feelings among people who share differences. One of the researchers that I interviewed denoted: “With an increased awareness unlike before as witnessed now; all that is remaining is for the government to act. You can see that people's awareness is greater, but the blame is on the government itself, which has some reluctance to implement and establish parties for one person one vote.”

Participants also mentioned that sensitization efforts usually took place in different communication channels and platforms such as radio, television, social media, etc. This claim was made evident by one government official who responded:

At this point, the level of awareness has increased and people are empowered around every corner, about political misdoings, and I'm pretty sure we don't hate each other, but that's because there are bad leaders and an ineffective political system.

5.3. Power Separation

In accordance to James Madison's federal study, in order to maintain a strong federal system, there is need for separation of powers between courts, commentators, and national government. The separation of power is parallel in terms of constitution order. Federalism is associated with separation of power (Vile, 1998) with consideration of what Western countries and culture perform. Governments that preserve the constitution largely strive towards enacting laws that serves political interest (Bellamy, 2010: 436). Constitutional governments endeavor to uphold integrity and the rule of law. Protecting government and constitution against arbitrary exercise of power, bringing the various stakeholders and interest groups to engage in dialogue and ensures that law reflects mutual concern and respect and a desire to promote the common welfare (Bellamy, 2010: 436).

Somalia's history since independence is dominated by a centralized system of government. However, it is preferred that power should not be accumulated in national level, rather it should be distributed to different representatives of the people. This helps in improving transparency, accountability and fostering a democratic system. Separation of power has a significant effect on integral federalism as argued by Bradford Clark who explains that phenomenon of power separation safeguards of federalism through limiting federal system that may displace state law (Clark, 2001). Some authors argue that separation of power can result to diminishing and competition among branches of government, with political competition being a bold segment towards supporting the political competition approach, and better democratic federal system (Clark, 2001: 1321).

This study considers it important to give autonomy to various government branches, institutions, and components of the state in parallel principles on a regional federal system of Somalia that is based and on the basis of lasting coexistence between different clans or sub-clans in different regions of the nation. The way that federalism affects the separation of power can dictate member states in matters beyond the authority that they legally hold, and therefore it would be useful to think about solving this

problem by establishing strong federal laws to promote cooperative federalism between the state and the federal government (Abubakar, 2014: 16).

This study is being conducted with a great consideration of the situation in Somalia and the strength exercised in the central/federal government. The strong support in areas populated by separate clans as a result of past experience of human rights violations and repression can be dealt with through federal government. The federal government is able to give power back to the citizens. James Madison considers power separation as a threat to governmental competition. This is in the nature of federalism spawning domination of political parties and inducing government actors and influences executive branch (Madison, 1788: 6).

As this study emphasizes the failure of governance in Somalia, federal member states can be seen as one of the state-building obstacles because of inequality in the power-sharing system among the federal government and member states. After the experience of federalism, some scholars (Ulusio, 2014), stated clannish federalism is not a solution for the problems of Somalia's issues and it is much worse than the present power sharing of 4.5 clans, the former military dictatorial rule, former clan-based rebel movements, and Islamic Courts rule.

Clan-based federalism devalues patriotism and citizenship, worships the identity of clans, and multiplies minorities and violations of human rights in every district. It reinforces territorial ambitions in neighboring countries. In contrast, Somali scholars have mentioned and explained a lot of complex problematic issues and conflict-related to clannish federalism. Those problems include obstacles in creation of clan boundaries, existence of long-lasting tensions between minority and majority clans who are in the same districts, the aggravation of the plight of the minority, the political, institutional, and territorial consolidation of clan cleavages and the reproducible permanent clan identity to continue the distinction between developing civic citizenship in the whole country. Some other sectors such as foreign affairs and security are a living proof of the failure of clannish federalism (Ulusio, 2014).

5.4. Effect of Corruption in sub-Sahara and Somalia

The global interest for governance improvement and the fight against corruption has increased in the 21st century. To this effect, in the year 2018, the African Union selected the theme; “Winning the fight against corruption” for the annual thematic issue to seek united efforts to fight the vice. A lot of countries in Sub-Sahara Africa like Ethiopia, South Africa, and Angola have already started their fight against corruption in order to strengthen their governance. These trends derive from the context in which SSA countries traditionally fall behind in terms of corruption views and governance in most other areas. The institutionalist view states that post-independence institutions and administrations in SSA are under-developed and that rent-seeking behaviors are intertwined with poor administration and endemic corruption (Hammadi & Mills, 2019: 4-10).

In the meantime, limited numbers of Sub-Saharan countries in Africa are not necessarily operating exclusively due to lack of legislative and institutional structures, as many countries introduced legislation criminalizing corruption and related crimes, improving their AML/CFT frameworks, and developing specialist anti-corruption agencies. Instead, it can be argued that a combination of restricted institutional ability and poor implementation of these system requirements are likely to lead to the heterogeneity in SSA governance. Strong and positively linked to high perceptions of corruption, poor economic and social results have been blamed on poor governance. Corruption and poor governance more specifically interfere with economic performance through multiple channels including money laundering, greater tax evasion, lower tax revenues and increased budget deficit central bank funding. This impedes both the composition and efficiency of government expenditure. Corruption and poor governance have thus been highlighted as key factors to rein in SSA growth and economic development (Hammadi & Mills, 2019: 4-10).

It is indeed very difficult and daunting task to find accurate data related to corruption in Somalia due to the absence of institutional records. However, there is widespread consensus that Somalia faces similar challenges of corruption in conflict-ridden countries, with widespread corruption pervading all branches of government and

severely hampering the state-building process. Rampant corruption is focused on deep-seated patronage practices, and compounded by lack of administrative services, poor leadership systems, and a limited capacity to pay public officials, including security forces (Anti-Corruption Resource Center, 2013). Moreover, the most state-building effort has relied on external sources of funding, which can under certain circumstances undermine the government's further accountability to its citizens and tend to strengthen patronage-based governance systems. (Menkhaus, 2007: 25-28).

Many observers hold that corruption within the Somalia transitional government (TFG) increased rapidly, with strong leaders of a "corruption union" operating impunity to manipulate the system and extending far beyond the borders of Somalia International Crisis (International Crisis Group, 2011). International governance indicators appear to confirm this assessment. Since the country was first added to the ranking in 2007, Somalia has consistently emerged among the most corrupt countries in the world in TI's Corruption Perceptions Index. In 2011, the country ranked 182 of the 183 countries evaluated with a rating of 1 out of 0 (very corrupt) to 10 (very clean). The country also performs extremely poor in the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators; evaluated in the six governance areas below 2.5 (scaled from 0 to 100) (International Crisis Group, 2011).

The country scored 0 in particular on political stability, government efficiency, the rule of law, and corruption control. According to the International Crisis Group, both small and large forms of corruption were commonly visible in Somalia in 2011, where government resources were widely misused and public officials acted unaware of their ethical behavior. Nepotism and favoritism job cultures, poor record-keeping and unclear internal procedures and regulations exacerbate the challenges of corruption and offer many opportunities for public misuse of private income resources. Unethical behavior and misuse of resources can range from unnecessary and extravagant foreign travel to western capitals to widespread misuse of state resources (International Crisis Group, 2011).

In its 2010 roadmap on building sustainable peace and a functioning state, the TFG of Somalia itself recognized serious financial mismanagement and corruption

(International Crisis Group, 2011). A report published in May 2011 by the Public Finance Management Unit 2 also revealed major discrepancies between the 2009 and 2010 TFG financial statements and actual internal and external income received report estimated that between 2009 and 2010 more than \$72 million in aid was stolen, and an extra \$250 million in income could not be reported (Freedom House, 2012). In particular, the report unearthed a shocking public financial mismanagement, widespread misappropriation of public and donor funds, ethical and professional negligence, and disguise, inter alia, the actual resource flows.

5.5. Somalia's Security Sector

Security is a key issue for the government to gain widespread approval. Increasing accountable, competent an institutional functioning properly i.e. police and judiciary is critical when it comes to nation building and development. The challenges of reviving the security sector are significant in restoring order to Mogadishu. It is expensive to establish properly functioning national police force in a country with an already straining expenditure. Militias still exist and maintain threats towards capabilities of restoring law and order. Enhancing public security requires the improval of police and judiciary through innovative partnerships with local private security and personnel that is just in the judiciary; private sector, in the security sector, and customs. Current conditions should compel Islamists to collaborate with other social advanced states to learn better practices (Menkhaus, 2007: 27).

Security in the country has by far progressed successfully with the assistance of African Union's operations inside the Republic of Somalia and other friends, and transferred to Somalia's army that is improving in terms of effectiveness. With a training of over three thousand soldiers and officers by European national, its operational capacity increased. SNAF is actively supporting operations in and around Mogadishu by providing between 10,000 and 20,000 troops; who are depending on Ethiopia support as the Somali government does not have the capacity to do so (European Commision, 2013).

Somalia is considered as having institutional dysfunctions and non-existence. There are approximately between 5300 and 6000 registered Somali's trained police

officers, with the SPF not being as effective as police officers in functioning states. They are expected to be ready for the transitional government after the African Union's operations inside the Republic of Somalia is completed. Reliability of policing can be improved through provision of new practices and support such as outsourcing local security arrangements.

Institutions of justice are still unstable, and require negotiation and frameworks that will recommend their merger into unifying federal structures at national level. There is a need for a degree of realism that the national police should not take over from military, police structures should be established, with resources and military ties as they continue to become effective with time, and thus the reinstallation and re-institutionalization of civilian policing will bring back civilization to the country (European Commission, 2013).

5.6. Turkey's Role towards State Building in Somalia

Even before colonization, Somalia continued to attract interest from several states, and thus, a strong territorial struggle existed to control its seaports for military bases and establishment of African markets by European countries including United States, China, France and at one time Djibouti, and now Turkey, which all consider the country as a geographical strategic location (Abdulle, 2018: 55-56). Since the central government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, the country has suffered from internal wars, absence of military, government, and terrorism.

Somalia is a successful model in Turkey's foreign policy as Turkey continues to build relationship with all African countries. Turkey has exploited the religious bond to endear itself closer to Somalia and to establish important relations due to Somalia's geopolitical importance. Somalia has played on the chord of Islam because Somalia is a majority Muslim country and Turkey has on its part exploited its national project to be the leader of the Islamic world, which includes several regions, and to impose its influence as it was before the 15th century. One of the reasons for the success of the Turkish strategy in Somalia is to establish the idea that it is not a foreign aggressor, but it is a supporter and partner to restore Somalia's glory. Western and Arab powers,

Turkey has directly engaged with the central government and not with the clans and has also supported and provided them with aid (Syed, 2018).

The Turkish-Somali rapprochement began since the outbreak of the "famine crisis" in 2011 and Prime Minister of that time, Erdoğan, hastened to visit Somalia to become the first non-African president to land in Somalia for over three decades. This along with provision of aid, which led to winning Somali hearts with the presence of Turkish intervention and considering him the only savior of Somalia. He ordered the appointment of a new ambassador to the country for the first time in 20 years to indicate the seriousness of the Turkish interest. Then in May 2010, Turkey hosted the "First Somali Conference" in cooperation with the United Nations and announced the "Istanbul Declaration" which is considered a roadmap to settle the situation in Somalia while playing a pioneering role in mediating between Somalia and the Somaliland region. Turkey has tried to bring the Somalis together and paved the way to drafting a constitution for Somalia to elect the first non-transitional president of Somalia. To fulfill this aim, İstanbul hosted the "Second Somali Conference" during 2012 under the title "Defining the Somali Future Goals for 2015" in cooperation with the United Nations Organization and with the participation of 57 countries and 11 regional and international institutions (Syed, 2018).

The "Mujahideen Youth Movement", which is the terrorist movement that exists in Somalia, targeted the "Turkish embassy" in 2013, because Turkey supports the "Somali government". Therefore, a new building for the embassy was established to be the largest Turkish embassy in Africa in Mogadishu, which is on a land of about 80,000 km², granted by the Somali government by Turkey in 2015. The embassy was opened in light of Erdoğan's visit to Somalia after the explosions that occurred in the capital "Mogadishu" one day before his visit, and he remained insistent. *I must visit Somalia and open the embassy, and I also announce that Turkey has begun and endured to present a gift to the Somali people by constructing a new building for the "Somali Parliament* (Syed, 2018).

Turkey, concerned with the Somali situation and issue, called for an international conference in İstanbul which was attended by former Somali President Hassan Sheikh

Mahmoud, Turkish President Erdoğan and a number of foreign ministers and some regional and international organizations. The conference held in February 2016, discussed ways to support the government and its efforts to rebuild national institutions and to enhance security and stability in the country.

There were also diplomatic visits in 2018, and the Somali Foreign Minister “Abdul Qadir Ahmed” met with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu in İstanbul, and the bilateral relations between the two countries were discussed, especially the political developments in Somalia, and ways to enhance this cooperation. This visit was within the framework of the Second African Ministerial Review Conference. In February 2018, Somalia witnessed the visit of the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister, Hakan Çavuşoğlu who met with some Somali officials to discuss relations between the two countries and issues of common interest and follow up on some development projects (Syed, 2018).

Turkey currently aims at restoring and reforming security in Somali, especially against terrorism with over 10,000 Somali military officials getting trained. As a result, it trains Somali’s troopers and police forces (Nassir, 2017). The main reasons behind providing poor security by government include the complexity and uncoordinated functions; having limited finances of Somalia, with its limited expertise, limited capacity, limited military capacity, incoherent and unclear command, and structures of control, weak control over finances, lacking accountability and civilian oversight (Olad, 2017).



Figure 4.1. Turkish Military Academy in Somalia (Stratejik Düşünce Enstitüsü, 2019).

5.6.1. Turkey's Role in Economic Development of Somalia

The Turkish presence in Africa, especially in “Somalia”, is highly dependent on humanitarian and economic aspects due to the availability of all elements of economic cooperation. First of all, Turkey has taken on itself the responsibility for "rebuilding Somalia". Turkish investments in Somalia amounted to about 100 million dollars in 2015 and focused on the field of economy and institution building. There are a large number of Turkish companies directly or through local companies in a number of Somali regions, especially in Mogadishu. Al-Bayrak Company has received the development and management of Mogadishu port for a period of 20 years with an agreement to go 55% of the revenue share to the Somali government's treasury. The “Favori” company also manages the airport “Adan Adde” in the capital Mogadishu after it developed the airport. Turkey established the first agricultural university in Somalia as part of a project to improve animal production, and it was called “Anatolia” within the “Zamzam University” (Syed, 2018).

Moreover, the volume of trade exchange between Turkey and Somalia skyrocketed to about \$ 72 million in 2015 and reached \$ 80 million in 2016, and we see that the most important products that Turkey exports to Somalia are “food and construction materials,” and it is natural for the volume of trade exchange to increase. Because of the influx of Turkish investments in Somalia, where there is an encouragement to invest in Somalia from the highest positions, we see that the recent visit of Erdoğan to Somalia has encouraged investment in all fields, and Somalia considers that it possesses many benefits and promises to invest. We witnessed the rise in the number of Turkish businessmen who have invested in several projects such as the Turkish Aviation School and the development of Mogadishu Airport (Syed, 2018).

5.6.2. Turkey’s Humanitarian Role in Somalia

Turkey plays an important role in the field of humanitarian aid to Somalia, and it is considered to be the most important country that does so, as one-third of Turkish humanitarian aid in Africa goes to Somalia (Tank, 2013, pp. 1-2). Turkey started its humanitarian role in Somalia when the famine crisis occurred in Somalia in 2011 and Turkey organized widespread popular campaigns to collect money. Turkey managed to collect about 300 million US dollars, and it is found that between the period from (2013-2018), Turkey provided to Somalia about 370 million dollars in in-kind and cash support. Turkish civil society organizations also provided aid worth 100 million dollars. Somalia witnessed severe bombings in October 2017, and Turkey was the first country to respond to Somali calls and transported the wounded people by air to Turkish hospitals, and the Turkish Minister of Health moved to Somalia to coordinate relief efforts, while Turkey provided dozens of tons of medical supplies (Mogadishu Center for Research and Studies, 2017).

On the other hand, Turkey has established the “Turkish Humanitarian Relief Organization”, (TİKA) which is one of the largest humanitarian support institutions in Turkey. It has established many mosques, schools, hospitals, orphanages, and Quran preservation centers, and carried out drilling wells. The Turkish Agency for Cooperation and Coordination (TİKA) office was opened in Somalia in 2011, whose role revolves around projects related to education, health, agriculture, infrastructure, and water

management. It is also seen the role of the Turkish Red Crescent in the “Mogadishu” camp and it provided shelter for about 20,000 displaced people inside Somalia and provided 15,000 meals that are distributed in homes Orphans and transportation (Mogadishu Center for Research and Studies, 2017).

5.6.3. Turkey’s Social Role in Somalia

Turkey is interested in investments in education because it helps in achieving social and economic development. Therefore, Turkey has provided great assistance in the field of education, as it has established several Turkish schools in Somalia, namely the “Anatolian School” and there are four branches: 3 in the capital “Mogadishu” and one in “Hargeisa” In “Somaliland”. There is “Banadir High School” and “Sheikh Sufi” school, all with the latest educational means to convey the Turkish identity to the Somali people and an attempt to spread and teach the Turkish language, and received about 15 thousand Somalis to study in Turkish universities and providing scholarships for them at Turkey's expense (Shire, 2019: 27).

Turkey has restored the main streets in Mogadishu, the “Mogadishu Port” and the “Somali-Turkish Hospital” that Erdoğan himself inaugurated on January 25, 2015, and the Mogadishu Friendship Road project, which connects Mogadishu Airport with the Presidential Palace, with a length of 23 km, and also involved in the construction of 10 thousand housing units and networks roads and lines of communication where there is a direct airline between “Ankara and Mogadishu”. It is sufficient to suggest that Turkey is responsible for the airlines that helped Somalia open up to the outside world and made it communicate with the world. Among the agreements signed between the two countries in the period of time (2013-2018), the cooperation agreement in building and managing Erdoğan Hospital in Mogadishu, cooperation in the field of water resources, the cooperation agreement in the field of health, a memorandum of understanding on higher education, a memorandum of understanding in the field of culture are one of the important agreements.

Turkey contributed to the field of health investment, so it rebuilt the “Dikfer” hospital, which is one of the largest hospitals in the capital. As part of the partnership in the medical agreement between the two countries, Turkey would establish and manage

hospitals built in Somalia as part of its support for a period of five years before handing over its operation to the government of Somalia. This agreement thus saw the establishment of Deva hospital and several other hospitals (Shire, 2019: 27).



6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Conclusion

Somalia is a country that is located in the horn of Africa and gained its independence in 1960. In the nine years of a multi-party system before the military coup led by Major General Mohamed Siad Barre in 1969, Somalia managed to create two civilian governments established by two democratic elections (Lewis & Janzen, 2020). The army accused the civilian government of being corrupt, unjust, and nepotist. The military also claimed that some of the agreements signed by the civilian governments were against the unification of Greater Somalia, a central political theme of contemporary Somalia. Twenty-two years of military rule over the nation brought nothing but worse. The military has done much worse than the civilian governments on all the counts they implemented (Mbugua, 2013: 236). On the other hand, a large portion of political leadership enjoyed huge amount of loyalty and trust from citizens who practice traditional (clan system) and integrated traditional and conventional social systems of governance. Although the earlier days of General Barre received support due to the fight against traditional politics, it finally failed to eliminate several traditional structures, which were established by clans for a long time ago. Similar to that, other state building initiatives failed due to inappropriate management of the clan conflicts resolution (Simmons, 2014: 41).

Having said that, it is important to note that British and Italian colonialists' administrative approaches were different in several aspects. The British fostered shared citizen identities in Somalia but consequently it failed to unite Somalia, which had been caused by the division of Somalia into two colonial-territorial rules. British had a lesser purpose in their formation of the protectorate unlike Italy. Both colonizers buttressed tiny empires and capitalized on intricacies of strong clan-based-society. The British's incorporation of indirect rule, prudent Somalia, and the empowerment of chiefs representing clans established their successful social control.

The difference between the British colonial administration approach with that of Italy is the cause of rift between Italian and British colonies in the past and today. The British approach considered to have an upper hand in creating a good governance system

of administration which has been borrowed by the succeeding governments after independence, while Italy's approaches and administration was the cause of violence in the southern regions. For Somalia to succeed as a state, it is important to incorporate and to recognize traditional systems of governance (i.e. clans and Islamist leadership). Clan's inclusivity in government is very important in uniting the country towards a stronger state structure (Tripodi, 1999: 129).

Italy's history of colonial administration ignored the existing clan system. They imposed Italian rule, which was a fascist direct rule that subjugated clans to their rules. Tripodi's description of the Italian rule supported corruption in the Barre government, which caused instability, destruction of clan systems, and civil wars (Tripodi, 1999, p. 129). The Migdal framework led to Italy's attempt to create a foundation for a central state that was adamant of including clans, disregarded clan rulers, supported military dictatorship. These factors destabilized the unity and peace in Somalia as opposed to the British's way of colonization. After the end of dictatorship of Barre in 1991, the country inherited violence and lacked an effective system of governance that could have secured peaceful transition. A civil war ensued following a great power struggle among rival clans from the south. Instability continued for twenty years. Similar to other regions that trace civil war back to colonizers, Somali's civil war is an emulation and imitation of the case studies of these Africa zones. But in contrast to other countries, Somalia's case is attributed by a collapsed government. Clan leadership was unaccustomed with power that was brought by colonizers. Italy's consequential rule reciprocated into the Barre era, which causes failed government and instability, while weakening state and clan relationships (Migdal, 1988: 15)

The British indirect rule left both divergent effects towards the current Somalia government. Bradbury described the British as having established a bureaucratic system that reinforced clan practices in matters relating to authority, justice, and security. Reinforced clan practices elevated elders' state positions and gave them duties that included resolution of clan disputes, and making key decisions in government. A western judicial approach that established individual over clan duties in criminal cases challenged customary laws without fully dissolving local authority. Putting elders in leadership positions, maintained unity and peace among citizens and positively shifted

clan towards conducting modernized governance. Traditionally, the major political problem involving clans was that of subordination of others. The British avoided impactful clan issues through investing in the Isaaq clan who formed the majority of all clans in the north and the minority clans could be identified as citizens by leaders. The indirect rule overcame traditional rules, and fulfilled social control and obedience to rules (Bradbury, 2008: 25).

The UN's directive for British and Italian Somalia to be unified in 1960 and transitioning of the country towards independence as a functioning state was limited to some extent. The two colonizers conflicted over education, languages, legal systems (civil or common laws), military, monetary systems, and other approaches. Somalia inherited civil law from the Italians; clan customary law, common law by the British, while Sharia law as the four different legal systems contradict each other. The period between 1960 and 1969 was stable but unproductive with failed adoption of legislation and representation of north and south, which after a military coup occurred performed by General Barre. The coup was seen as a solution to overcome the corrupted government that is why a lot of people welcomed it. Barre commanded extreme compliance and strategy of reforming governance using Scientific Socialism. In 1991, the Barre regime collapsed, and clan warlords, interest groups, and most militants in the south began taking advantage using armed conflict and crisis (Drysdale, 2000: 5).

The military rule imposed a dictatorial structure and started to detain the opposition. In addition, the national assembly and all opposition parties as well as the constitution of the country were suspended. The rule of the regime oppressed the people, arresting the politicians who were opposed to the communist ideology. Somali civil government officials were accused of corruption and but under the military dictatorship, people lost their freedom of speech and other civil and political rights (Kateijns, 2013: 236).

During its time in power, the military adopted the Latin alphabet that was more suited to the Somali language to combat ignorance and to make the nation one of the strongest military and developmental forces in Africa. In 1977, the regime organized a war against Ethiopia, which did not take full account of its effects.. After the military

government failed to capture the area of Ogaden, which was the main target, some military generals led by Mohamud Irro tried to stage a military coup but it failed (Yusuf, 2012: 181-183). Most of the assassins were arrested and executed. Some of the generals who managed to flee the country sought refuge from Ethiopia and set up rebel groups. The first military opposition was the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) that was established by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed in 1978. However, after the coup failed, the initiators were executed and the colonel formed a military opposition against the government and began targeting the resident areas of the clans belonging to most of the failed coup initiators. The military attacks carried out by the government against these clans culminated in the deaths of thousands of civilians, the rape, and the displacement of thousands (Abshir, 2016: 95).

In 1991, these opposition groups eventually managed to get the military dictatorship out of control but they did not come up with an alternative strategy to save the country from anarchy and disarray. Instead of establishing a government, the militias began battling each other and their struggle was focused on the purge of the regime leader's clan. Consequently the nation entered into a chronic civil war that culminated in the deaths and starvation of hundreds of thousands and the displacement of millions of people. In rural areas, Somalis always struggled for pasture land, livestock water supplies, and theft of livestock (Abshir, 2016: 95).

To the south, persistence by Al-Shabaab terrorist organization built a tougher obstacle for peace and state building. Al-Shabaab was recognized as the biggest Islamic terrorist group in modern history of the country, which is also an explanation of the south's inability to come out of civil war in the 1990s. In this period, the terrorist group increased its influence and strength, using harsh Sharia law. In the south, Islamic courts integrated Al-Shabaab into their operations and slowed down government functions. This continued to weaken state in its mandate of using resources, penetration of the population, organizing state services and financing social development. It further derailed the already established British system in the north (Simmons, 2014: 45).

After Barre's overthrow in 1991, Somaliland withdrew itself from the state of Somalia, and the south entered into civil war among warlords. Locals suffered

throughout this period until in 2006 when the Islamic Courts Union started restoring some order, providing some public services, and settling disputes. Sheikhs within tribes traditionally conducted disputes settlement until constant power struggle among warring clans, which failed the traditional system of conflict resolution. Notorious, brutal, and violent acts by Al-Shabaab were supported due to their affiliation with ICU. Its projects across borders saw the Al-Shabaab receive attention from the United States in 2010; following its launch of attacks in Ethiopia and Kenya's Westgate attack of 2013. The US's counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was insufficient in completely leveling Al-Shabaab. Terrorism activities are also to blame for the collapse of the country's history and failure of political, democratic, and social systems after many years of chaos. The combined strategy involving African Union, covert intelligence operations and US strikes have proven extremely effective in eliminating Islamist threat (Simmons, 2014: 45). AU's, Western's intelligence's and UN commitments towards eliminating Al-Shabaab's dominance in the south is commendable. The United States' small and yet effective effort continues to weaken Al-Shabaab's presence and dominance.

Clan system's years of existence outnumbers colonial, democratic, and nationalist systems of doing things as a solution to Somalia. Colonialism, especially Italian one, is responsible for the failed state. The clan system has a role of working with state towards achieving social control. The future of Somalia depends on reunification of all region of the Great Somalia.

Since federalism in Somalia is a new concept whose essence and meaning has not yet been fully understood by the country's leadership, it has been seen as a solution for the problems of Somalia's state-building obstacles. Then in 2012, federalism was adapted as a clan-based governance model that has created some new puzzles to institution building in the country like the lack of integration among clans, the increase in resource-based conflicts, and the misunderstanding of regional leaders and state leaders.

Shortly, peacekeeping operations will not succeed unless it is supported by the Somali people. Since Ethiopia and Kenya participate into these operations,, the Somali people have scruples about these peacekeeping operations because they fear that both

countries will only serve their interests and that they will profit from the continuation of the civil and political conflict in Somalia, including the civil war. The international community must cease to intervene with the internal affairs of the Somali Government

6.2. Policy Recommendations

The Federal Republic of Somalia will hold another general election in early 2021 to allow the country to pursue new leadership to replace the current Somali government, which is already recognized and supported by the international community. On 2 May 2013, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution establishing a United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia. The resolution claimed that it would be deployed as an enabling body to support the peacekeeping and state-building agenda in Somalia. The current Somali government mandate was to focus on five main areas: governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, the growth of the federal system, including general elections, and coordination of international donor funding. So, the new coming government is recommended to focus on these aforementioned agendas.

On the other hand, some scholars explain that foreign aid, institution building, peace-keeping and peacemaking process are the main international responses to the conflicts in Somalia as part of Africa. After decades, Somalia's new federal government has in recent years positively achieved stability from assistance provided by African Union, and global partnerships. The continued support from African Union's mission and support by US military strike has decreased threats by Al-Shabaab militants. Comparing Western and African military intervention, Western military support achieved lackluster results of peace and restatement of state functions in a period of two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq, while African Union's dealing with the Somalia crisis is taking longer due to Africa and global based response challenges.. More important than that, almost three decades of foreign involvement have taken Somalia to a standstill, which means that they must avoid interference with Somalia's internal affairs. They represent the needs of Somali rivals rather than the interests of Somalis. They must support Somalia to create the Somali National Army, which is capable of securing the borders of the entire country as well as the return of the law and order of the country,

which is capable of protecting the rights of civilians and protecting their citizens from all threats, whether from internal or external sources.

The possibility of friendly reunification with the breakaway northern Somaliland region would be an arduous mission. And Somaliland has remained mostly beyond the reach of the central government of Mogadishu in the last three decades and appears very hesitant to join its longtime colonial partner in the south. Furthermore, the Northeast Puntland area has even established its own local government structure, but it failed to share a clear view of the permanent separation of Mogadishu. So there must be a solution for that obstacle that has appeared after the collapse of the Somalia government.

If the Somali people do not recommend the federal model as a solution that builds a strong state that unites Great Somalia and a central government has not been seen as a solution for the Somalia state-building options, the upcoming government should find another model that may be the typical solution for establishing a strong government in Somalia. To answer that issue, some scholars recommend one remaining option,; “Devolution”. Devolution means that the central government is responsible for controlling the government; however, some authority has to be decentralized to the regional level (Qasim, 2019).

On the other hand, the issue of tribal politicization can be prevented if the groups involve in forming political parties that are focused on the principles and vision of Somalia. It is utterly necessary to have a democratic governance change and to hold free and equal elections for all people. In addition, there will be no solution to the transition from tribal politicization to tribal parties. In reality, the problem is going to be a lot bigger and more complex. So, awareness creation is required to increase public participation of the citizens to enlighten them to vote for a candidate after assessing the candidates and the parties while overlooking voting on the basis of a tribe.

The Government of Somalia must come up with a strategy to refrain from being dependent on foreign assistance, so that it must develop and encourage the economy of the country by investing in the areas with relative advantage, such as industrialization of agriculture, livestock and fisheries, as well as the development of seaports and airports.

Finally the majority of the participants contend that the Somali constitution must be revised because the existing constitution does not meet the needs of the Somali people because it has been written by foreigners and it neither covers nor serves the needs of the Somali people.



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